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Abstract
The main focus of this thesis is to solve the believability problem in video game agents
by integrating necessary psychological and sociological foundations by means of role
based architecture. Our design agent also has the capability to reason and predict the
decisions of other actors by using its own mental model. The agent has a separate mental
model for every actor.
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Introduction
1.1

Overview

Applications of research toward believable agents are not exclusive to video games.
Human-like agents possess a great potential for research in a variety of fields such as
economics, psychology, and sociology for testing validity of their theories [1, 2]. Humanlike agents’ applications in warfare [3, 4], crowd simulation [5], interactive drama [6-12]
and educational role playing games [13, 14] have proven to be cost effective and
beneficial.
Believability is largely dictated by the audience’s personal and social perspective. What
seems acceptable as a normative behavior in North America may seem odd in Asia. For
this reason, it can be difficult to find a universally acceptable definition for believability.
In most agent models there is an emphasis on designing specific aspects of human social
life while ignoring others. To further complicate the believable agent-modeling problem,
the very nature of human social behavior is still at the heart of much ongoing research.
This diversity of approach and the lack of a unifying definition for believable agents are
two factors that make this design problem a serious challenge. One of the perspectives
often dismissed in agent models is the evolution of behavior driven by observations of
other agents in their social environment.
Loyall presents widely accepted criteria for believability in agents [15]: personality,
emotion, self-motivation, change, social relationship, consistency of expression, and the
illusion of life. For the illusion of life, Loyall outlined several characteristics such as
appearance of goals, concurrent pursuit of goals, being reactive and responsive, situated,
resource bounded, exist in a social context, broadly capable and well integrated.
Most effective agent models apply appraisal theories to model reaction to external
stimulus and encode personality traits. Despite the careful attention paid to designing the
1

inner workings of the agent model, little attention is given to modeling the formation of
knowledge about other agents. One of the most fundamental elements of social
interaction is the formation of beliefs about others. In some literature this concept has
been referred to as a theory of mind [16].
This thesis addresses the problem of believability in autonomous agents by proposing
emotion, Memory and planning components, and integrating them through the role
concept. This integration makes the agent behavior coherent based on roles formalization
without imposing predictable actions. The agent behavior and decision making is a
reflection of its current state, including social context and roles that define agent’s
relationship to the current context. Additionally another revolutionary feature in our
model is the creation and application of other agents’ attributes in decision making. The
agent planning and action selection in general is a direct function of how it perceives the
world state, in other words from its individual perspective structured by its roles. Our
design enables the designer to easily add more diversity to agent’s deliberative and
reactive behavior without going through fundamental changes.

1.2

Background

Many frameworks and agent models have been designed for achieving the goal of
autonomous believable agent. In this section, we will briefly discuss some of the major
contributions in this area. The FATIMA [17, 18, 19] architecture is one of the most well
designed models that enables agents with decision making abilities, embodied emotion
and personality traits. It has been used in several projects such as Fearnot! [20], orient
[21], and the process model of empathy [18]. The ability to check different appraisal
models and theories as well as a modular design make FATiMA distinguishable from
other works. There are three main processes in the FATiMA core architecture: appraisal
deviation, which evaluates the relevance of an event to the agent and determines appraisal
variables; affect deviation, which takes appraisal variables as input from the previous
process and outputs the Emotional State; and action selection. One of the innovative
features in FATIMA is the notion of double appraisal [21], which works with the agent’s
projected action or its action’s emotional impact on the other characters. The suggested
way of doing this is to execute the agent’s mind and use a projected action as if it were an
2

event; in this way, the agent considers the emotional impact of its action as if it has
happened to himself.
EMA [22, 23] is another computational model of emotion. The three main assumptions in
EMA are appraisal causes emotion; there is a cycle of appraisal and reappraisal, and
appraisal is shallow and quick. EMA succeeds in designing a good emotional reaction to
external stimulus. However, there is not any notion of autonomous goal generation in this
model. Although EMA’s emotional reaction and coping strategies are not domain
dependent, EMA is still not a general model that can be used for a believable agent based
on Loyall criteria.
PsychSim [24, 23, 24, 26] is an implemented multi-agent simulation tool for modeling
social interaction and influences [27]. Each agent in this model has its own decisiontheoretic model of the world, including other agents’ beliefs. The basis of this model is
the fact that human actions depend not only on their immediate effects, but also on how
we believe others will react to them. Although the main focus of PsychSim is to take
other agents’ mental models into account, it unfortunately does so using static contextdependent stereotypes. Each stereotype has been embedded in an agent model. For
example, the bully has several stereotypes for the teacher and for each choice of action he
uses the partially observable Markov decision problem algorithm to check the utility of
the action. One of the interesting features of this model is the ability to change beliefs,
including other agents’ nested beliefs, upon receiving a message. This task is done
through an algorithm that measure factors such as self-interest, bias, and consistency.
PsychSim is one of the few works that tries to implement the concept of a theory of mind.
However it is limited by using predefined sets of stereotypes that have been chosen based
on the role of the agent in a scenario.

1.3

Problem Statement

Most existing architectures for believable agents use emotion and personality models as
well as goals to create illusion of life. However these believable agent architectures, fail
to provide the required integration between agent components. The lack of internal data
integration prevents the agent from having consistent meaningful behavior. Another
3

problem is the absence of the agent’s individual preferences, such as personality and
priorities in agent’s processes, such as planning. Additionally although being situated in a
social context is one of the important qualities in human social interaction, there are very
few models that simulate this aspect or use it to enhance agent’s architecture. Finally the
great potential of using other agents’ models to predict their decision and preferences has
not been explored thoroughly.

1.4

Proposed Solution

The focus of this thesis is on integrating elements of classic emotion and personality
model to provide qualities such as being reactive, being responsive, and having the
presence of a goal and personality in the agent. At the same time we address the problem
of being situated in the social context and acting coherently according to a consistent
pattern of behavior by integrating internal data and processes. This is done by introducing
a role based architecture and using role variables to customize agent processes such as
planning and emotion appraisal to achieve the agent’s goals.
We believe that in order to create a believable agent there are three main requirements
that should be considered. First of all, the architecture needs a set of necessary data to
identify the agents as individual entities. This includes goals, personality traits and the
reward system that cause distinguishable preferences, choices and reactions from one
agent to another. Second, the architecture is required to encapsulate this data in the
agent’s social context. A role based architecture provides this encapsulation and
flexibility. Finally, the agent processes that include reaction to stimulus and planning
should be directed by the agent roles.
To accomplish this, the agent data that includes goals, their priorities and personality
traits should become integrated in its roles. The agent can have multiple roles that can be
triggered by their target or context. Agent emotion reaction to any received event will be
determined by emotion rules; however emotion responses are related to an agent’s social
context by means of role concept. The extent that an emotion can affect the agent is a
function of its active roles’ personality traits. Agent emotional state is an aggregation of
appraised emotions from individual events which is also a function of role attributes. This
4

method of using personality traits based on context and active roles in the appraisal
process is part of integrating agent’s internal data.
The Memory component and implementation of theory of mind is another novel feature
in our architecture. The agent is able to remember received events and their emotional
effects. On top of the ability to remember other actors’ actions, the Memory component
has the flexibility to create a model of other actors by interpreting their actions. Other
agents’ models can be fed to the agent in the offline mode as well. Finally the agent uses
these models to predict other actors’ future actions.
A Role based architecture provides reactive and goal directed behaviors based on the
social context. However our most significant contribution is applying the agent roles and
models of other agents to the planning algorithm. Our planning algorithm uses the agent
individualized reward system in utility assignments. This means different agents based on
their goals and active roles have different utility. Not everyone in the game environment
is looking for one universal goal. Using roles to calculate state utility makes our agent
planning process more believable and less predictable. Furthermore the planning
algorithm base takes into account uncertainty of an open world like a game environment.
In facing uncertainty that has a root in other actors in the environment during planning,
each agent uses another agent’s mental model stored in its Memory to predict their
choices. This consideration of other actors’ decisions on world states and its usage as a
factor in planning has not been explored before by other agent models in a dynamic
manner.
In each step the agent decision is a function of its active roles, personality traits, its
mental interpretation of other agent preferences and action consequences. The final result
of the planning module is a sequence of actions that uses agents’ roles in every step of the
plan evaluation. This close integration of the agent role and planning process is unique in
believable agent architecture.

1.5

Contribution

The main focus of this design is to solve the problem of Creating Believable agents.
There have been some efforts in the past to solve this problem; however there is still a
5

huge gap with what has been defined as a believable agent and currently existing models.
This gap will be discussed further in Chapter 2. Our work makes a contribution to create
a more believable agent by designing an architecture that has the following qualities:


Role based architecture: All the agent attributes have been designed and
embedded by means of role components. The agent can have more than one role.
This mechanism ensures that the agent performs coherent behaviour in one
specific role. The agent role is a set of attributes that define its overall perception
and priorities in a specific context for which that role has been defined.



Theory of Mind: One of the main factors in the agent decision making is
considering other agents in its planning, and keeping the record of their previous
interactions in the Memory. The agent interprets other actors’ behavior in order to
be able to predict them in the future.



Memory: The agent is able to remember previous interactions in the world as well
as their emotional effects. The Memory module prevents the agent from repeating
the same mistakes over and over again. Storing emotion as well as events is a
novel approach that aims to imitate human Memory. Humans are not only able to
remember their past experiences, but are also able to associate past experiences
with particular categories of emotions.



Socially Situated: The role based architecture facilitates the agent’s interpretation
of the world through the lens of its roles. A socially situated agent does not
follow rigid behaviour, but rather has the flexibility to change and evolve its
decision making according to what has been expected from it. The expectation
according to the social context has been defined by the agent’s roles. The agent’s
roles will be considered in all the agents’ process such as:

goal selection,

intention recognition, planning, emotion reaction, state utility calculation, etc.
Consideration of active roles in the agent process ensures that the agent’s
behavior has been affected by its social context. The case study in Chapter 4
thoroughly discusses the quality of being socially situated in our model.


Planning: Our planning architecture takes into account all of the agent’s roles
attributes. The planning module guarantees that in all steps the agent evaluates

6

states or actions based on its active roles. Furthermore, our planning system
facilitates dealing with the world’s non-deterministic nature by introducing a nondecision node which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. Anticipation for
nondeterministic situations makes the agent more believable in its decision
making process.


Acting in dynamic environments: Our planning approach ensures that the agent
can deal with dynamic and non-deterministic environments like a game. This aim
has been facilitated by: a) considering action consequences in the planning, b)
considering other agents’ possible actions, c) making the best plan by taking into
account factors a and b. The embedding of personality traits and values systems
(discussed in Chapter 3) enables the agent to choose the best possible action
rather than staying with one particular set of actions. This best possible action will
be defined not only by the agent’s variables but also based on the social context
that makes our agent to choose a different action while facing same problem that
involves different parameters.



Flexibility: The role based architecture enables the user to design their desired
agent with customised qualities. This architecture is easy to understand and
guarantees coherent interaction of agents in the world based on the authored role.

1.6

Outline

Chapter 2 discusses the definition and application of believability. We briefly review
classic AI techniques that are widely used in the game industry. Then we will discuss the
general BDI paradigm and agent models that attempt to go beyond classic AI techniques.
Chapter 3 is a detailed description of our agent architecture. We present components and
the data flow to create the illusion of disbelief. The planning component explains
thoroughly how other agents’ models can be reflected in decision making. Chapter 4
represents our case study on a prisoner’s dilemma and demonstrates how our model can
contribute to simulate believable socially aware characters with unique characteristics
that take other actors’ decisions into account. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis, providing
a summary of the work and a discussion of directions for future work in the believable
agent area.
7
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2

Literature review

Believability is largely dictated by the audience’s personal and social perspectives.
Therefore, it would be difficult to find a universally acceptable definition of believability.
The diversity of approaches and the lack of a unifying definition for believable agents are
two factors that make this design problem a serious challenge.
Video Games are an interactive medium. However, the lack of emotions and personality
in Non-Player Characters (NPC) is the main factor that prevents the audience from being
immersed in the game environment. In current games, the player can easily fool NPCs;
they do not have any character or individuality other than performing repetitive tasks in
the game environment, which quickly causes boredom, frustration or loss of engagement.
The motivation for embedding emotions, personality, and decision-making into NPCs is
to create human-like agents. This is a central problem of game AI that cannot be
resolved by current approaches. This change firstly affects the game environment and
narration and secondly provides the opportunity for the video game industry to target a
larger group of audiences.
In this chapter we will start with a definition for believability, and then briefly discuss
applications for believable agents in Section 2.1.2. We will follow the discussion in
Section 2.2 with a brief review on two classic methods for game AI: Finite-State
Machines (FSM) and Rule-Based Systems. In Section 2.3 we take a deeper look at
psychological foundation for emotion and personality. In Section 2.4 we will discuss BDI
(Belief, Desire, and Intention) as a general architecture that attempts to address
believability in agents. In Section 2.5 we will present the summary.

2.1

Believability

Characters in plays, movies or novels have been created by the mind of an artist. Once
the story is created, it cannot be changed. On the other hand the main power of video
games as an entertaining medium is the active role of the audience or player. The
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problem here is how the designer can use this great potential of an interactive
environment for players. We believe one of the main factors is to create a dynamic
environment by using emergent and believable characters.
A Socially believable intelligent agent has the potential to make a significant change in
audience immersion. Believable autonomous agents can open a new area in game
narration. The game environment can be managed with a minimum level of supervision
of the story. Consequently the player’s choices and actions in the absence of a static plot
like those that are already in use can make meaningful changes. Furthermore, the
application of a believable agent is not limited to video games. Believable human like
agents have a high potential to be used in critical areas of research such as warfare [3,4]
and crowd simulation [30]. Last but not least, they are a cost-effective method to test
theories on human behavior in diverse areas of research such as educational role playing
[13, 14], and psychology [5].
When we talk about a believable agent in the video game industry, we are looking for an
illusion of life; in other words, a suspension of disbelief. In real life situations, humans
are not perfect. Their behavior and choices do not always confirm predictions. Our
decision-making process does not always satisfy a utility function. At least, not all
humans have the same priority and utility across different choices. In the next paragraph
a well-known problem from decision theory will be discussed. In that problem,
inconsistencies between the results from real experiments and decision theory’s pure
mathematical predictions will be presented.
In this scenario, which is often referred to as the dictator game [43], there are two
different roles: the giver and the receiver. The giver is in charge of dividing and
distributing a finite amount of money (let’s say $100) between himself and another
person. Based on decision theory, because the other person has no choice but to accept
this distribution, the giver can decide to give him the minimum amount (here $1). From
the decision theory standpoint it is obvious that the most logical solution for the giver is
to minimize the gift and maximize his portion. However, psychological testing on human
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subjects shows that people do not always do as decision theory suggests. In other words,
givers usually give more than the minimum amount.
The results from testing the dictator game on human subjects supports our argument that
not all humans adhere to the same utility function. The dictator game is only an example
to illustrate the failure of classical approaches such as game theory [52] or decision
theory in predicting human behavior in real life situations.

2.1.1

Believability in Recent Literature

In order to come up with a general, well-defined model for believable agents, we first
need to recognize the requirements and then build them into the agent. One of the widely
accepted sets of criteria in the field of believable agents is Loyall’s definition [15]. He
analyses requirements for believable agents from two main perspectives. The first is
artistic and the second is experience with the agents. In the following paragraphs we will
briefly discuss his criteria:


Personality: Loyall defines personality as the most important requirement for a
believable agent. In Loyall’s definition, personality is what gives all the agent
actions and behavior consistency. There are many personality models in
psychology, but Loyall does not suggest any particular model. What he does
suggest as a definition of personality is rather complicated to implement. From a
theoretical perspective, there are many different ways to define a personality while
there is no single model or set of variables widely accepted for doing so. However,
even after choosing a model or set of variables, the harder task is to represent this
personality in every aspect of the agent. From Loyall perspective, just as in a movie,
two characters impose their personality on every single action. Two agents should
be able to represent their personalities in the same manner. By his expectations,
imposing different characters to the same event should have versatile impacts.



Emotion: The second criterion in Loyall’s list is emotion. He states that emotions
are necessary for believable NPCs. It is a fundamental requirement for human-like
agents to not only demonstrate emotions but also to understand others’ emotional
reactions. In order to implement this aspect the agent needs knowledge that defines
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what is emotion and represents that based on their personality. The way emotions
are felt and how they affect others is yet a complicated problem on its own. The
other important feature from the emotion perspective is how an agent will be able to
communicate its emotional state. When an agent feels sorrow it should be able to
show that emotion in the environment by bursting into tears. Additionally, the
agent’s emotional state should be reflected in the agent decision making process.
An agent who is furious will not be able to take a rational action just as a human in
rage.


Self-motivation: Self-motivation here identifies a type of agent that does not simply
react to the environment but also has some internal goals and motivations. Most of
the previous works in the field of believable agents focuses on believable reaction
to outside stimulus but does not pay as much attention to embedding autonomous
goals in an agent to cause it to follow its own intentions. How and when and how
much an agent feels these inner motivations are some important problems to
consider in order to make the agent more believable.



Change: The agent’s growth and change are fundamental characteristics of a
believable design that cannot be arbitrary. They should happen based on the agent’s
experience and characteristics. In classical drama, character change is one of the
leading and turning points in the sequence of a developing a story. However, when
it comes to automating this process in a game environment, there are many
obstacles that the designer must overcome.



Social Relationship: Humans are social entities. It is a requirement for a believable
agent to be able to engage in social interactions and maintain this relationship with
a social network.



Consistency of Experience: The agent behavior and emotion expression should be
consistent. As mentioned, the personality part of the agent needs to have one unified
spirit that could be demonstrated through its actions. From the macro perspective,
the entire agent’s behavior should be consistent. From the micro angle, this
consistency should form every single action of the agent.

12



The illusion of life: The illusion of life categorizes wide range of variables in
Loyall’s classification including appearance of goals, concurrent pursuit of goals
and parallel action, reactive and responsive, situated, resource bounded and
existence in a social context.

In conclusion Loyall describes how an agent architecture designer should take several
factors into account which are taken for granted in conventional media as well as a plan
for applying those factors to the agent. For example, an actor in a movie can walk, eat
and get engaged in a conversation without any difficulty but for an agent to be able to do
several tasks in parallel will not be as easy. Until now we gave a thorough definition for
believability in human-like agents. In the following we introduce the application of this
type of agents.

2.1.2

Applications for believable agents

One of the main applications for believable agents is in the video game industry.
Believable NPC helps players to immerse themselves in the game. Repetitive and
inconsistent behavior based on designer’s decisions or hardcoded techniques can easily
break the immersion. On the other hand, human-like agents can add a new dimension to
players’ experience in the game by evoking emotion such as empathy. Furthermore, the
new generation of video game architecture seeks to involve dynamic narrative in the
story telling in order to provide the player with a unique experience of his own.
The future of video games is in providing a unique narration for each player, by
facilitating a mechanism to use their action in making meaningful changes in the story
line. This aim can be accomplished by populating the environment with emergent
autonomous agents and a drama manager [6, 7, 8].
Additionally, human-like agents’ application in warfare [3, 4] crowd simulation [5] and
educational role playing games [7] has proven to be cost effective and beneficial. Virtual
environment is another field that can receive benefits from believable NPCs. Recent
research has proposed populating virtual environment with believable human-like agents
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for medical purposes. This type of environment can be used as a method of rehabilitation
for patients who suffer from psychiatric [58, 59].

2.2

Classic Techniques in AI

NPCs have been conventionally hard coded in games. This method is computationally
desirable for the game environment. Also, from the design perspective it does not need a
complicated architecture. In this Chapter we take a look at two common methods for
game AI: FSM (Finite State Machines) and Rule based system. Note that traditionally,
the purpose of using AI in games was not to address the agent believability. Our
discussion in this section attempts to highlight the fact that the classic approach on its
own is not sufficient to make the agent believable.

2.2.1

FSM

A finite state machine is one of the simplest and mostly used methods for designing
intelligent agents. A Finite state machine is an abstract model consisting of a set of states
and transition functions which map a given state and input condition to another state.
Each state determines the agent behavior [54].
One of the biggest advantages of this architecture is its simplicity. A Finite State Machine
can be easily implemented by set of if-then rules or switch cases [27] This
implementation has a compelling advantage which is the low computational cost.
Understandability, predictability, little infrastructure support and deterministic behavior
are among other strong features that help this architecture survive since the very early
days of computer game programming.
Despite all these advantages in a complex environment when range of possible actions
and consequently number of states increases FSM architecture will not be a reliable
solution. The reason is all possible situations should be encoded in the rules by the
designer, which places a huge burden of responsibility on his shoulders. Furthermore it’s
a static method that does not address the dynamic nature of video games.
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Mac Namee et al. called gents solely based on FSM as reactive agents and have identified
them as the simplest form of intelligent agents [28]. The authors here argue that lack of
an internal world model makes this model incapable of reasoning. Based on the above
description, the reactive agent can easily break a player’s immersion with its repetitive
actions and it will be easy for the player to fool it with his moves. In conclusion the cheap
cost of reactive agent implementation results in fragile performance; therefore it does not
fully satisfy play experience for the audience. Still this does not mean that the believable
agent architecture should fully stop using FSMs, but in order to create a socially situated
agent, this approach will not be enough.

2.2.2

Rule Based system

A Rule based system is another method for designing intelligent agents. Basically a rule
based system has three main parts: working memory, rules memory and an inference
engine. Working memory stores known facts and assertions made by the rules. The rule
memory contains if-then style rules that operate over the facts stored in working memory.
In a rule based system once a rule fired in the system, it can trigger some action or state
change, or the content of working memory can be modified by adding new information
called an assertion [27].
The main component of a Rule based system is an inference engine. There are two basic
algorithms for making inferences: forward chaining and backward chaining [54].
Forward chaining is the most common algorithm for rule-based systems, which involves
matching rules to facts stored in the working memory. It does this by checking if
statements. Potentially more than one rule can match the given set of facts in working
memory. Then it triggers a selected rule or rules and the whole process is repeated until
no more rules can be fired. Backward chaining is the opposite it starts from an outcome
or a goal and tries to figure out which rule should be fired to arrive at that state.
Inference engines and specifically backward chaining provide the agent with planning
ability; that’s why Mac Namee et al. [28] named this category of agents “deliberative”
[28]. Working and rule memory are the models of the world in the agent’s mind that a
reactive architecture like FSM is missing. However this method also has certain
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drawbacks. First of all it needs constant maintenance of a knowledge base which in a real
time environment may cause problems with performance. Furthermore inference based
reasoning is computationally expensive. Finally and most importantly, due to the
structure and search method, a Rule Based System will not be able to meet the real time
requirements of a believable agent.
Scripting is a special case of a rule-based system. Each object and character in the game
environment may have dozens of scripts that determine their behavior in a particular
situation. In each frame all of these scripts for the object should be checked to see if
conditions in the frame satisfy any of the attached scripts. Those scripts which have the
matching conditions will be executed. Scripting has the same disadvantage as FSM; the
designer must predict and hard cod all possible situations and circumstances.

2.3

Psychological Foundations

In Section 2.1 we discussed the definition of believability and in Section 2.2 we discussed
traditional methods in AI. In this Section we are reviewing the psychological foundation
for two of the main requirements for the agent believability from Royal’s perspective:
personality and emotion.

2.3.1

Personality

Many researchers define personality as one of the main requirements for believability. In
Loyall definition, personality is what keeps all the agent actions and behaviors consistent.
Basically, he believes that personality is what makes us distinguish between two
characters in a movie. It is based on their manner, tone of voice, outfit, or even their
favorite hobby. He emphasizes that personality is one of the fundamental requirements of
a believable agent. However, the main problem with personality is how it should be
designed and how NPC will be able to represent this concept. We will provide a preview
of the personality definition in psychology. Then we will present some of the most
prominent personality models and how researchers in the field of AI implement them.
Oxford dictionary defines personality as the complex of all the behavioral,
temperamental, emotional, and mental attributes that characterize an individual. In [5],
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Durupinar et al. encompassed the same terminology though they defined personality as a
pattern of unified behavioral, temperamental, emotional, and mental traits. Samuel Ma
states that personality has a high influence on decision making, action selection,
expressiveness, and character behavior [29]. Although we stated that emotions also have
an effect on the above parameters, the main difference between emotion and personality
is the fact that personality is long lasting and persistent while emotions are temporary. In
other worlds, emotions give us an idea about how the agent would behave in a particular
state of mind, but personality is the causal reason that the behavior occurs within that
state of mind.
The rationale of introducing personality in a multi-agent system is to provide diversity in
agent behavior and their choice of actions and planning [44]. During social simulation,
having different personalities enables researchers to test different strategies [28, 29, 30].
In the case of human-like agents in the virtual world, personality is a key ingredient in
creating a suspension of disbelief for the audience. Personality enables the designer to
make each character unique and represents this coherently through different media in the
virtual world. Johns and Silverman, in [31], identified personality as a dimension of
individual differences that should be considered to determine what causes people to
choose different alternatives despite holding similar emotional states. It is a measure to
explain why people follow different goals, and demonstrate different thinking processes
and emotional responses.
Personality theorists in the psychology domain have strived for decades to define basic
dimensions of personality that generate the differences among people [32]. Generally
speaking there are two main stream theories: trait theories and social learning theories
[29]. A class of traits theories define what traits are and assume that a unique
combination of these traits are ingrained in each person’s mentality. Based on these
theories, future behavior and the decisions of an individual can be predicted if we have
enough knowledge about their traits. However, social learning theories argue that
personality can be changed from different situations and new experiences.
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2.3.1.1

OCEAN Personality Model

One of the most influential personality models in the field of AI is OCEAN or the Five
Factor Model (FFM) [5], also known as the Big Five. In this model, personality can be
devised into five dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness,
and neuroticism. These traits have been defined in a bipolar fashion so we can view them
as a range from -1 to 1. The highest score in each trait means the character is in harmony
with that trait and the lowest score demonstrates opposite qualities of that trait are being
projected. In a virtual world, if a person is not very social and during a social occasion
does not feel content, his score on the extroversion scale would be lower than 0 with a
default range of -1 to +1. In the following paragraphs, what each trait stands for will be
discussed [25, 33, 34].


Extraversion: Extraversion influences the frequency of social interactions. That is to
say, the more extroverted a character is, the more they will interact and appear
outgoing. This trait also influences the interpretation of positive versus negative
interactions. Extroverted agents place more importance on positive events than
negative ones. Therefore, the effects of Encourage, Agree, Facilitate Problem and
Gain Competence interactions increase as extraversion increases, while the effects
of Discourage, Disagree, Obstruct Problem and Lose Competence are reduced.



Agreeableness: Agreeableness influences the frequency of positive socio-emotional
interactions. It determines the level of friendliness, generosity, and the tendency to
get along with other people. More agreeable agents agree more often with others
and encourage others more frequently. In addition, agreeable agents perform more
actions for the group rather than for themselves. On the positive end of the
spectrum, expressions of altruism, concern, and emotional support are shown, while
the negative end represents hostility, self-centeredness, spitefulness, and jealousy.



Conscientiousness: Conscientiousness indicates the level that the individual is
governed by conscience. In this context, conscientiousness determines the level of
which a person is organized and careful. Conscientiousness affects the planning
algorithm. It affects the degree to which an individual considers the full
consequences of his actions before taking them. Higher levels of this trait allow one
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to avoid courses of action that lead to negative consequences even if they are
accompanied by substantial positive actions. Furthermore, there would be an
unlikelihood of choosing a course of action that would be considered dishonorable
or risky. Often this may be at the expense of missed opportunities but success is
also related to this trait.


Neuroticism: Neuroticism refers to emotional instability and the tendency to
experience negative emotions. A high level of neuroticism causes an individual to
place more importance on negative events rather than positive ones. For decisionmaking purposes, this trait governs the degree to which a human being is willing to
experience stress, pain, or take risks in the pursuit of goal achievements.



Openness: Openness describes the imaginative and creative aspect of a human
character.

2.3.1.2

Reiss’s 16 motive Model

Reiss’s 16 motives is another interesting model. Reiss contends that motives are the
reason governing people’s voluntary behavior. They indicate the meaning of human
behavior, and may reveal a person's values. Motives often affect a person's perception,
cognition, emotions, and behavior [35]. There is a motive behind each consequence of
action in reaching one’s goal. Furthermore, these motives can affect one’s behavior
unconsciously or indirectly. Consequently these motives that are created in a human mind
are what form the personality.
Although the OCEAN personality model provides a general framework to investigate a
human being’s personality, using this model to create personality in human like agents
needs careful consideration. The OCEAN model does not provide mappings from traits to
human cognitive process such as emotion appraisal [22, 23], decision making or intention
recognition. This lack of a well-defined mapping makes it a bit of a challenge to apply it
practically in human like agents.
Another interesting personality model in scholars is Reiss’s 16 basic motives theory [35].
The basis of Reiss’s theory is laid in his eight hypotheses [35]. We are going to bring
attention to those hypotheses in order to understand this model with more depth:
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Each of the 16 basic desires is a trait motive (Hypothesis 1). This is the first
hypothesis in Reiss’s model. Everything in his model is based on these 16 traits and
how people decide to achieve them.



The satiation of each basic desire produces an intrinsically valued feeling of joy, a
different joy for each basic desire (Hypothesis 4). These different types of joy
satisfy a need.



Everybody embodies the 16 basic desires though individuals prioritize them
differently (Hypothesis 5). People behave as if they are trying to maximize the
experiences they have of these 16 intrinsic joys with their own individual priorities;
this is what makes people behave differently or seek different goals. In other words,
these 16 desires are encompassed in every human being but what differentiates
them is how much value they place on each desire. From another perspective, one
unusually weak or strong desire on one of these traits can be used to define one’s
personality. For example, this taxonomy can be used to demonstrate a power
hungry personality when someone has a strong desire to gain power over others but
has a normal set point for all other traits.



Each basic desire is theoretically regarded as a continuum of potential motivation
anchored by opposing values (Hypothesis 6). The theory of 16 basic desires holds
that individuals are motivated to aim for a point of moderation, (called a set point or
sensitivity). Set points are what an individual is aiming for. Once they reach that set
point, the desire is fully satisfied however temporarily.



The theory of 16 basic desires holds that motivation is based on discrepancies
between the amount of an intrinsic satisfier that is desired and the amount that was
recently experienced (Hypothesis 7). When a person experiences more power than
he or she desires, the individual is motivated to be submissive for a period of time
to balance the experience toward a desired rate. When a person experiences less
power than he or she desires, the individual is motivated to be domineering for a
certain period of time.



Basic desires organize our attention, cognitions, feelings, and behavior into a
coherent action (Hypothesis8). We pay attention to the stimuli that are relevant to
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the satisfaction of our desires, and we tend to ignore a stimulus that does not satisfy
our desires.
In conclusion, Reiss makes a case that psychological needs are linked to motivations. He
provides a conceptual framework based on an analysis of the nature of basic human
desires and psychological needs. Moreover, he makes a solid connection between basic
needs, traits, motivation, and personality type analysis. This allows for a sensible
coupling of personality descriptions within social change [6].
Reiss’s model can benefit a designer with designing goal based characters that have the
same motives as humans. It also provides guidelines on how to make different
personalities and how to make them distinguished. However, this model is still abstract in
the sense that it talks about satisfying a motive through traits within an extremely broad
setting. Additionally, implementing all of these 16 traits for NPC in the world is
computationally expensive and seems unnecessary. Furthermore Reiss distinguishes
between individual’s personalities only based on their motives and dismiss other
temperament. Many scholars think that personality should distinguish between individual
emotional responses and action selection. These two factors have not been considered in
Reiss’s model.

2.3.1.3

Summary

In this section we discussed the definition of personality from scholars. We also
explained two widely accepted models of personality: OCEAN and Reiss’s. The OCEAN
model is general and expressive enough for explaining the nature of human differences
through personality; however it is too abstract to be applied in a computer agent.
Unfolding traits to low level behavior in this model is subjective to the designer choice.
Reiss’s model defines personality dimensions based on human motives and categorizes
them into 16 motives. Reiss’s model clearly explains and distinguishes how each trait is
related to a motive in human beings; however it does not explore other dimensions that
can be used to distinguish between two different personalities such as emotional reaction
or action tendency.
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2.3.2

Emotion

Emotions in [36] have been defined as current states with a specific quality and intensity
as an outcome of complex physiological processes for communication. The processes
include neural activity of the brain as well as physiological responses of the body.
Marcella et al. state that, emotions arise from social conditions which set conflicting
interpretations of the goals a human wants to achieve and what the world around him
suggests[38]. From Marcella et al.’s perspective, Emotions arise from the dynamic and
continuously evolving world that leaves our decisions and actions with uncertainty.
Marcella et al. goes on to propose that emotions are a means of navigation during social
contexts and when dealing with uncertainty if an individual has limited control over
future events.
Additionally, Carnevale et al. [39] say that emotion not only affect an individual’s
decision making, but also their interpersonal decision making processes. He states that
emotional expressions are not simple manifestations of internal experience but rather the
methods people choose in order to communicate their beliefs, desires and intentions. For
instance, guilt occurs when someone transgresses an accepted social norm signaling
regret, which serves as an apology, and in turn contributes to avoided reprisals from
others.
Some researchers prefer to categorize emotion into two classes of primary and secondary
emotions [39]. Primary emotions refer to fast and reactive responses such as when one is
experiencing immediate danger. The other side of the spectrum holds secondary
emotions. These are based on the ability to evaluate preferences over outcome and
expectations: for example, feelings of ‘relief’ or ‘hope. A fundamental aspect of
appraising secondary emotions is dependent on the situational and social context.
Consequently, they are more reliant on the agent’s cognitive reasoning abilities.
EBDI[40,41] and WASABI discussed in [42] are two architectures that take into account
these classifications.
There are different motives in the scientific research community for creating a
computational model of emotion. In the field of psychology a computational model of
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emotion permits the comparison of different theories in each respect so as to improve the
intuitive understanding of said parameters [45].
In the engineering field, the motive for modeling emotion is an indirect one. Modeling
emotion is a vital requirement in the creation of a virtual human [46]. In the field of
human-like agents there are certain applications that should be considered for emotions in
a design. Taking into account how intense emotions impact people’s behaviors and
decision making processes is an important aspect in modeling traumatic events [5].
Fundamentally developing and expressing an emotion response is one of the
requirements for NPCs. The inability of a character to reveal its emotional state would
possibly be interpreted by the user as missing sympathy [47]. The character that always
has the same emotional state, regardless of its context, breaks the sense of immersion for
the player. Expressing emotions plays an important role in increasing the believability of
the character in the game. The agent should be able to feel anger and express that upon an
unpleasant event such as getting hit by other agents. The agent which communicates its
emotions can have a bigger impact on the player by creating a sense of empathy for him.
Emotions have a great influence on humans when planning, making decisions, and during
social interactions. The agent in rage will not be able to make rational decisions or
assume optimal actions. A designer should find a way to link the agent’s decision making
process to its emotions.
So far the essentiality of emotion-embodied characters has been discussed. Ultimately,
characters that interact with humans need a model to synthesize emotions and express
them. With the same logic, they should be able to sense the emotional states of other
actors including humans or agents. In order to propose a critical component of more
effective human-computer interaction, which factors in the emotional state of the user, we
need emotion models in virtual humans [48].
It might be useful to distinguish two classes of computational models of emotion: Black
Box models and Process models. These two approaches differ in the degree of abstraction
of intervening variables [48]. Black Box models focus on the input-output relationship.
They provide little information concerning the mechanisms involved yet can help when
investigating sufficient variables as well as facilitating a sound ground for practical
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decision making [48]. Process modeling attempts to simulate naturally occurring
processes. Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. The Black Box
approach seems more feasible and computationally has a cheaper cost for development.
However, in the case of manipulation and performing in social contexts, it needs to be
studied more carefully.
There have been several emotional models developed. Ortony, Clore, and Collins
classified emotions based on the stimuli that generated them to twenty-two different types
of emotions which is often referred to as the OCC model [47]. These categories, based on
valence reactions to situations, are constructed either as being goal relevant events, as
acts of an accountable agent, or as attractive or unattractive objects [47].
In the Classification phase, the character evaluates an event, action or object. This
determines which emotional categories have been affected. For this part, standard goals
and attitudes need to be specified, organized, and stored by the designer of the character
[47]. One way is to put all the possible events, actions, and objects in a table and for each
row in the table specify which emotional categories may be affected with what level of
intensity along with how this intensity should be calculated. For a limited range of
actions in a simple world this method could be applicable. However as the complexity
increases, it becomes more infeasible to do so and the system needs a definition of the
types of abstractions to be able to handle this part. To summarize, the agent needs some
sort of knowledge base as well as abstraction to identify what is going on in the world.
There are several reasons for the simplification of the OCC model [47]. As an example, if
the agent uses an emotional model to change facial expression, its emotional categories
should be limited to the ones it can express. Ekman proposed six basic emotions (anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) that can be communicated efficiently
through one’s facial expression [60]. Interestingly, he suggested that these six basic
emotions are cross cultural. When the goal of the architecture is to make a believable
agent, the emotional categories should not be considered if they do not add up anything
from the believability perspective. Examples would include the importance of an agent to
express happiness from receiving a hug from a friend and show sadness or
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disappointment from an unjust slap. A character that is unable to distinguish between
these two actions (receiving a hug and being slapped) would easily break the player’s
immersion. Similarly, being able to sense gratitude and gratification is based on two
different trigger conditions: gratification results from a praiseworthy action the character
did themselves whereas gratitude can stem from another’s action. A question that arises
here is whether this distinction adds any more believability to the agent. If yes, how could
the agent express them in different manners?
Another flaw of the OCC model is the negligence of explanation in how different
emotions should merge together. For instance, when an agent is in a low mood while
receiving a gift (this may make him less sad) or when an agent is extremely angry while
receiving a hug (this may make her less angry but could not bring their mood to a full
cheerful state). How these different emotions are mixed and interacting with each other
have not been mentioned in the OCC model.
Lastly, some emotional categories in OCC such as “be happy for” are based on the
desirability of action consequence for the action target. The agent needs to be provided
with a specific agent model so that it could decide the desirability of action for others. In
[17], the author discussed empathy in resolving this issue and there was research that
offered methods for creating the player model. Ortony simplifies the OCC model by
excluding categories that need another agent model through five positive and five
negative categories. These include joy, hope, relief, pride, gratitude, love, and distress,
fear, disappointment, remorse, anger and hate, respectively.

2.3.2.1

Summary

Emotion is an important element that can aid the audience by immersing them in the
game scene. Simulating emotion has another application to test the validity of theories
and design effective interactive applications. In the field of psychology, the nature of
human emotion has been studied. Although there has not been a universal agreement on a
universally acceptable definition of emotion, some models such as Eckman and OCC
attempt to explain the mechanism of emotion reaction in human beings. However
applying these models to the agent without careful consideration is not feasible.
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2.4

Believable Agents

Traditional AI techniques such as FSMs and Rule Based Systems are not very effective
when it comes to creating believable behavior as discussed in Section 2.2. The designer
needs to hard code all possible situations and behavior and any mistake or unexpected
event can easily break the audience immersion. In Section 2.3 we discussed some
psychological foundations such as emotion and personality that have been defined as
main requirements for believability. In this Section we briefly discuss a modern approach
toward making agents more believable.

2.4.1

Modern Approach

BDI is a general framework which defines rational agents based on belief, desire and
intention, which represent information, motivational and deliberative states of the agent
perspective [50]. From the philosophical point of view, this framework discusses how a
living being takes or cause an action in the world.
The BDI model provides a reasoning pattern for action selection based on rational
choices. Instead of jumping from a desire to an action in one step, there will be two
processes: first determining an intention, and then choosing an action. This separation
makes the platform stronger than a simple rule-based system. Also, it results in more
believable characters that have the ability to reason about their environment and make
decisions based on their internal mental/emotional state, beliefs and motivations.
BDI discusses a very simple statement that if human beings have a desire to satisfy their
hunger and if they think eating a cake is a way to achieve that desire, then they will eat a
cake, or at least develop an intention to eat a cake once they get hungry. This basic
example illustrates how BDI interprets actions. We need to embed this natural
interpretation in the agents in order to make them believable.
One of the most important aspects of BDI which has been pointed out in [50] is the
notion of commitment to previous decisions which makes a balance between reactivity
and goal-directed behavior. At the same time it gives the agent the stability and
consistency in reasoning. Two parts have been identified for this notion: the commitment
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condition and the commitment termination. The former is what the agent is committed to
maintain (for example: belief and desire) and the latter is the condition under which the
agent gives up the commitment.
Most of the models that implement BDI platform use traditional AI techniques such as
rule based systems, fuzzy logic and different planning systems in their components.
However, as we mentioned before, the problem with traditional AI techniques is the
infeasibility to manage all necessary requirements for a believable agent.
On the other hand, one of the requirements for a believable agent is the ability to function
in a social context. The Theory of Mind (TOM) discusses the process of decision-making
based on forming and using recursive models of others. The BDI architecture helps us to
provide the agent with this nested belief structure and to use it in decision making. In
virtual characters, this option helps actors to predict the behavior of other characters and
take an action based on this prediction. PsychSim[24] is one of the few works that tries to
implement the concept of a theory of mind.
EBDI (an architecture for emotional BDI agent ) is another generic architecture for an
emotional agent that expands BDI by implementing practical reasoning techniques
separately from the emotion mechanism. It adds the influence of primary and secondary
emotions as has been discussed in Section 2.3.2 into the decision making process of the
BDI architecture. Additionally, it has the flexibility to have different emotional models
and reasoning engines plugged in. In EBDI, when there is new information from the
environment, the agent generates belief candidates which together with current intentions
trigger emotion updates. Based on the new emotion status and the new information,
together with current intentions as a guide, the agent re-evaluates its beliefs. Then it
generates desires based on its beliefs and intentions. Finally, under emotional influences,
it picks the best option or intention. In this stage the secondary emotions are triggered.
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2.4.2

Believable Models

There are many agent models that have been designed for achieving the goal of
autonomous believable AI. In the following paragraphs we briefly discuss some of the
major contributions in the area of believable agents
PsychSim [14] is an existing multi-agent simulation tool for modeling social interaction
and influences [13]. Each agent in this model has its own decision-theoretic model of the
world, including other agents’ beliefs. As has been mentioned earlier, PsychSim is one
of the few works that tries to implement the concept of a theory of mind. However, it is
limited to using predefined sets of stereotypes that have been chosen based on the role of
the agent in a scenario. The basis of this model is the fact that human actions depend not
only on their immediate effects, but also on how we believe others will react to them.
Although the main focus of this PsychSim [22] is to take other agents’ mental models
into account, it unfortunately does so using static, context-dependent stereotypes. Each
stereotype has been embedded in an agent model.
In the field of believable agents, the FATIMA architecture is one of the most well
designed models that enable agents with decision making abilities, embodied emotion
and personality traits. One of the innovative features in FATIMA is the notion of double
appraisal, which works with the agent’s projected action or its action’s emotional impact
on the other characters.
The OZ project [55] was one of the very first systems that tried to integrate a wide range
of capabilities such as perception, reactivity, goal-directed behavior, emotion, social
behavior, natural language analysis and natural language generation, goal-directed
reactive behavior. EMA[22] is another computational model of emotion. The three main
assumptions in EMA are appraisal causes emotion; there is a cycle of appraisal and
reappraisal, and appraisal is shallow and quick. Unfortunately there is not any notion of
autonomous goal generation in this model.
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2.5

Summary

In this chapter we introduced the concept of believability in agents. We briefly discussed
the applications of human-like agents. We discussed the infeasibility of classic techniques
in AI to facilitate believability. We also discussed emotion and personality as
psychological foundations, which have been defined by Loyall as main requirements for
believability. Finally, we describe a general framework and some existing models that
attempt to solve the problem of believability. Still, there is a huge gap between definition
believability from Loyall and current models. Our proposed model in the next chapter
aims to fill this gap.
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3

Proposed design

In this Chapter we propose a novel architecture to address believability in NPCs,
considering the believability criteria that has been discussed in Chapter 2. Our model
facilitates reactiveness as well as active pursuit of goals in role based architecture to unify
the agent characteristics. In the following paragraphs we give a brief overview of the
model contribution:


Role Based Architecture: In the proposed architecture all agents’ qualities and
attributes have been formalized through a role concept. Every agent in the
environment has a context free default role that defines the agent in general context.
The role integrates agent goal directed behavior, personality traits, preferences and
facilitates their application in the agent process.



Theory of Mind: Theory of mind (TOM) is one of our novel features that help the
agent to consider others’ preferences during decision making. Theory of mind
enhances the Memory module to not only remember previous interactions but also
interpret them to generate a model of other actors. These models will be used in the
agent in process of decision making, and provide it with the ability to dynamically
update his social knowledge about other agents’ personality.



Practical approach to psychology foundations: Many believable agent architectures
use personality models to create the illusion of life in their agents. However, one of
the main technical difficulties with applying personality models is putting their
specification into practice to create a coherent set of behaviors [5]. Part of this
difficulty is due to lack of well-defined connection between traits and how they
affect the agent processes. Our model categorizes personality traits to: reactive,
behavioral and context free traits to facilitate this connection. On top of this
categorization the agent data flow that will be explained in Section 3.1 ensures that
these personality traits will be used in the agent process. This categorization for
personality trait does not affect our model general quality to use any specific
personality model. As long as the designer identifies a specific personality quality
and how the agent cognitive process should be affected by, it can be applied to the
agent.
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Customized Planning: Planning and path finding is a well-studied area in AI,
however until now no model can be found in the literature that uses the agent
internal variables (including the agent mental and social context such as roles,
personality trait and emotional state) to evaluate the planning tree. Our proposed
planning algorithm uses agent internal variables to evaluate available options in any
probable state and finally chooses the best possible plan by considering both utility
and the agent role.



Memory: Memory has not been defined explicitly as a requirement for a believable
agent, however to follow a plan and actively pursue goals the agent should be able
to store world state. Our proposed Memory model helps the agent to store the
emotion appraised from every event. The agent can remember a series of events and
their affection on its Emotional State

Agent process manages and connects all agent modules and unifies them to create
believable behavior based on agent roles and the current state of the world. The
requirement specifications for our agent model are: a) demonstrate emotion reaction
towards world events, b) facilitation of goal directed behavior in the agent. Agent process
should be able to satisfy these criteria by using agent role to channel embedded individual
characteristics in decision-making.

3.1

Data Flow

The agent data flow is shown in Figure 3.1. The agent process starts by receiving a
message from the world. The event will be appraised by emotional rules; active roles that
represent the agent social context affect this appraisal process. The received event may be
saved in the Memory; furthermore it may cause the agent to update its original plan.
Intention recognition selects a goal and planning generates a plan for this goal. Arrows
from agent active roles to all other modules demonstrate how the agent process has been
affected with active role components.
Agent role has a set of personality traits, beliefs and goals that will be discussed in detail
in Section 3.5. The Memory module including the agent TOM profiles is discussed in
Section 3.4.
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In the following paragraphs we take a closer look at each of these steps:


Perception: The agent receives the information about the world state through
message passing (arrow 1). The Perception module task is to receive these
messages, unfold the message and pass the event to the emotion module.

Figure 3.1: Data flow in the agent architecture.


Emotion Module: Emotion and Memory work together to appraise emotion from
the received event. In the first step, the emotion module uses general emotion rules
to appraise an emotion. For example if the agent loses his wallet, it will make the
agent upset. However, there are other types of events that need the Memory module
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consultation, if an event confirms a goal state achievement it cannot be appraised
simply by applying emotion rules.
Collaboration of emotion and Memory is necessary to apprise the group of events
that makes any change on the agent active plan or previously stored goal state.
Memory checks the received event with agent goals and plans; if it detects any
accomplishment or failure, emotion rules will be applied. This separation of data
and process imposes a technical difficulty for processing back and forth between
the emotion and Memory modules. However, it makes our system flexible for using
any emotion model in the emotion module.
Emotion from an event will be applied to emotion reactive rules. For example, if the
agent fails to achieve a long term goal it may burst into tears. It is important to note
that the agent does not plan to execute impulsive actions (arrow 3) whereas the
emotion rules dictate impulsive action execution upon the appraised emotion. The
final step in the emotion module is to integrate the result of appraised emotion into
the agent Emotional State.
Emotion expression, impulsiveness, and how the agent copes with an appraised
emotion could be determined in our model in one processing cycle by applying
emotion rules and consulting with active roles as well as Memory. The Emotion
Traits threshold, emotion rules in response to a received event and integration of
these appraisals to update the agent Emotional State in each processing cycle will
be affected by active roles (arrow 2). This will be described further in Section 3.3
and 3.5.


Memory: The event and appraised emotion will be stored in a Memory Cell. The
Memory updates facts which have been changed. The agent TOM module processes
the event, and updates agents’ profile that were involved in the event based on
actions tags; this will be discussed further in Section 3.4.1.4. The Memory module
is also responsible to keep the track of the agent planning and validating the next
action in the sequence of events by checking its preconditions with the current
world state. If the Memory validates an action, it will be executed by sending the
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confirmation to the planning module, otherwise the action is invalid, and so the
current stored plan and the agent should make a new plan (arrow 5). If the current
plan has reached the final state, the Memory informs the intention recognition to set
a new goal for the agent (arrow 4). The record of achievement or failure of the plan
should be stored in the agent active roles (arrow 6).


Intention Recognition: Intention recognition processes the agent active roles (arrow
7) and sets the agent intention on the most important goal. The goal importance and
the intention process to select the most important will be thoroughly explained in
Section 3.5.1 and 3.6. This goal will be passed to the planning module.



Planning: The Planning module receives the agent goal and the current world state
(including the agent active roles, arrow 8) comes up with a plan that takes the agent
from the initial state to the goal state. This plan will also be stored in the Memory
(arrow 5). If the planning module receives the confirmation from Memory that the
current plan is still valid, it will execute the next action in the plan action sequence
(arrow 8).

In this section we briefly discussed the agent high level process and how all modules
work in collaboration with each other and the agent active roles. In the following
section we briefly discuss preliminary terms in our design and then move on to discuss
each component thoroughly.

3.2

Preliminaries

Our main system consists of three main sub-systems: Authoring System, Event Handler
and Agent (Figure 3.2). The Authoring System enables the designer to create the
environment including facts, actions as well as agents. The designer can create his own
agent with given roles. The Agent role formalizes its deliberative and reactive behavior in
the environment. The Agent demonstrates the design’s innovative features to simulate a
believable behavior based on its authored roles and traits. Finally the Event Handler’s
main task is to collect actions from all agents in the world and output the final result
based on the designer’s given scenario. At runtime, the Event Handler receives actions
and distributes the result. In this Section we give a brief description of our main
preliminary terms.
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Figure 3.2: System main components

3.2.1

Fact

The fact representation is similar to first order logic in that it provides an evaluation of
the truth or falsity of facts, but differs in that numerical values can be assigned to a fact as
well. Each fact has a name, takes a predefined number of literals, and outputs either a
number or true/false value. Facts can also have a target. For example, the fact Happy
(Sue) targets Sue. A numeric value enables a quantitative comparison between facts from
the same types. Quantitative comparison between facts greatly enhances state utility
calculation for planning and decision making where the agent will be able to evaluate
different world states and choose the one with the highest utility. A world state is a
collection of facts with their environmental variables (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Schematic world state with its facts.

3.2.2

Action

An Action is a single atomic step that has been identified with a name. Each action has a
set of preconditions, and post conditions with their associated probability (Figure 3.4).
Like world state presentation, post conditions and preconditions are represented by
conjunctions of facts. As long as preconditions are satisfied, the action is valid to be
executed. Upon the action execution, only one post condition will affect the world state at
run time. The post condition of Sue Attacking Kathy could be Kathy getting injured or
possibly dying but only one of them will become true. The agent is informed about the
probability of each post condition while the actual post condition after the action
execution will be determined by the Event Handler.
In the action structure, there are certain types of preconditions that the agent could not
plan to make true. More precisely, the action can only be chosen if the agent’s current
state satisfies the precondition. For example, in the case of Sue attacking Kathy, a
precondition could be that Sue’s affinity towards Kathy is below a certain threshold. If
this precondition has been satisfied by the current relationship between Sue and Kathy,
attack is a valid action. Otherwise, Sue will not plan to first decrease the affinity level in
order to attack her later on in the scenario. However, for other preconditions, the agent
could plan to make them happen; for example, Sue will enter the room that Kathy is
inside to attack her.
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In order to remove the need for an ontology system, we chose to use a tagging system for
actions. There are two types of tags that will be used to annotate the action. The first
group is emotion appraisal variables such as desirability, desirability for other,
praiseworthiness and etc. from the OCC model. The second is personality trait variables.
Emotion appraisal variables help the agent appraise the emotion of a received action
based on emotional rules. The second type of tags will be used in the agent personality
traits and completing TOM profiles will be discussed in Section 3.5.2.2 and 3.4.1.4. The
main premise behind personality tags is that the agent has a greater tendency to choose
actions with traits that closely correlate to their own personality, and when other agents
perform actions, the agent can interpret other agents’ personalities by means of these
tags.

Figure 3.4: Action with a precondition and three post conditions
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Action personality tags may come from a classic personality model trait like OCEAN.
The designer can create his own meaningful tags in the context of the story. For example,
the designer can generate a tag like extroverted and stipulate that social activities require
a higher degree of the extroversion trait whereas individual activities demand a lower
level. Tagging a group of actions with the extroversion trait makes it necessary to use it
as a personality trait in some of the agent’s roles.

3.2.3

Event Handler

The agent passes its selected action to the Event Handler, which then determines the
action’s post condition (Figure 3.5). The Event Handler applies the necessary changes in
the world state based on the post condition and distributes the action, along with a
corresponding new world state, to other agents through message passing as an event. For
example, if Sue chooses to slap Kathy, she passes this action to the Event Handler. The
Event Handler then distributes “Kathy was being slapped by Sue” to other agents. How
this action affects each individual agent’s state or their social relationships will not be
included in the message.
More interestingly, the Event Handler has the potential to manage the story at run time
based on the designer’s previously written plot. When the agent executes an action that
has more than one post condition, the Event Handler determines which one will affect the
world state. It manages the story at run time by collecting actions and determining results
according to the scenario or world rules. For example, the action of shooting a rabbit has
two post conditions: the rabbit may get killed with a probability of 30 percent or it may
run away with a probability of 70 percent. If the agent shoots a rabbit, the Event Handler
receives this action. If shooting killed the rabbit, the Event Handler has to modify the
world state according to that. Note that all events should not be scripted in the Event
Handler by the designer; instead they should be determined dynamically based on the
world’s state.
In conclusion, the Event Handler collects agents’ action and distributes the result. It
keeps the world state consistent by modifying facts upon newly-received actions. Finally,
it notifies the agent about new settings in the global environment. For example, if the
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agent walks in to a room, the Event Handler is responsible for describing the room to the
agent, including who and what takes place in it.

3.2.4

Message Passing

Messages inform the agent about the world’s current state, or of events that have taken
place. When the agent chooses an action, it should be passed to the Event Handler, upon
which the Event Handler distributes this action as an event inside of a message to other
agents in the world. The message will be processed by an agent perception module.

Figure 3.5: The Event Handler functionality in the runtime

3.2.5

The Authoring System

Authoring System is a design tool to create the environment as well as agents. The agent
will be defined by at least one role and its goal, personality trait, and TOM profiles. The
designer can use the Authoring Tool’s functions to modify different characters in his or
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her own proposed scenario or story. The Authoring Tool facilitates implementation of
various traits and roles that generate emergent behaviors at runtime. The Authoring Tool
can also provide users with template roles. These template roles can be customized to
define different characters by means of different attributes in the same social context that
has been define by the role.

3.3

Emotion

Loyall has defined emotions as one of the first requirements for believability. Presence of
emotion reaction, effect of emotion state on decision making, and their role in regulating
social relationships are a requirement specification of the emotion module in our
proposed model. In everyday language emotional state (mood) and emotion are used
interchangeably; however many scholars believe that it’s necessary to distinguish them
from one another. Gebhard discusses that emotional state is not generally related to one
event, action or an object, whereas emotion can be associated with only one event [50].
Gebhard describes emotional state as an affective state which has a great impact on
human’s cognition functions such as decision making, motivation, and appraisal.
In order to take this difference in to account, our model proposed two components for
managing agent emotion data: a) Emotion Traits, and b) Emotional State Dimensions.
Emotion Trait is output from immediate event appraisal by emotion rules, for example
love, hate, anger, gratitude. The agent Emotional State is an aggregation value of
appraised Emotion Traits.
To follow a data driven approach and create a more robust and reusable architecture we
decided to separate emotion data representation (Emotion Traits and Emotional State
Dimensions) as discussed below from emotion rules. As it has been discussed earlier in
Chapter 2 there has not been any universal agreement on one acceptable emotion model
among scholars. Separation of data and process for emotion subsystem enables the
designer to place his own desirable emotion model.
Emotion rules dictate how the agent should react to an external stimulus. They should be
applied in three consecutive phases; first the event will be appraised based on appraisal
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rules. The result of this process is an Emotion Trait like anger or gratitude. Second the
appraised trait will be checked for any reactive action. Finally the Emotion Trait updates
the agent Emotional State.

3.3.1

Emotion Trait

The Emotion Trait is the immediate emotion appraised from an event by applying
emotion rules. For example, accomplishing a goal makes the agent happy and losing a
wallet makes him upset. An example of Emotion Trait in an OCC model is: Pride,
Shame, Love and etc.
The Emotion Trait structure should minimally have the following variables:


Name: Each Emotion Trait has a name such as: Pride, Anger.



Range: Each Emotion Trait has a valid range which defines minimum and
maximum value that it can be assigned to it.



Threshold: Threshold determines the degree that this Emotion Trait needs to
achieve to be felt or triggered an action tendency. An Appraised Emotion Trait
with the value below the Threshold will be discarded. The Threshold of the same
Emotion Trait for one agent is the same.



Value: Value should be within the valid range that will be determined by applying
emotion rules.



Emotional State Dimension Tag: Each emotion has one or more Emotional State
Dimension Tags that identify which Emotional State Dimension it belongs to. The
mechanism of this mapping can follow any emotional state representation model.

An Emotion Trait can be used to represent the agent emotional reaction to what is
happening in the world. The designer can assign the same values to different agents’ trait
variables (Emotional State Dimension Tags and Threshold). However, our model has the
potential to override trait variables in the personality section of the agent and therefore
create distinguishable behavior. For example, by assigning a low threshold to an agent’s
anger trait, the agent would demonstrate anger more easily.
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3.3.2

Emotional State

Emotional State plays an important role in decision making and action selection.
Fundamentally it is not each individual Emotion Trait based on appraised events that
affects the decision making process, but their aggregation that plays a leading part in
action selection. Note that the effect of emotion in the agent decision making based on
the agent Emotional State is different from emotional reaction apprised from a received
event. Emotional reaction will be applied simply by applying emotion rules whereas
Emotional State affects the process of decision making. For example, the agent who has
been frustrated for a while may deliberatively make a plan for suicide bombing. In our
system each action can have a set of non-procedural preconditions; Emotional State is
one of the main leading factors to validate these non-procedural preconditions. For
example, in order to initiate an attack, the agent should be very desperate or angry, as
long as the agent Emotional State is close enough to this state, attacking is a valid action.
However, if the current Emotional State does not satisfy this precondition, the agent
could not plan to make it happen.
The Emotional State data model can have several dimensions. Each dimension minimally
should include:


Name: Each dimension will be identified by a name.



Range: Each dimension has a valid range.



Value: It shows the accumulated value of all Emotion Traits that has been added up
to each specific dimension based on their Emotional State Dimension Tags until
now.



Decay Rate: Each dimension has a decay rate.

Emotional State dimensions and process of accumulating all appraised emotions is a
computationally desirable approach to manage the agent Emotional State. Once the trait
has been defined it will be added up to its associated dimension. One problem with using
a model like OCC with 22 traits is a heavy computation burden to maintain value of each
trait over time and update them.
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3.3.3

Emotional Rules

Emotion rules define how the agent should react to a received event. Genuinely they
define how the agent appraises an emotion towards a particular event or should possibly
react based on the appraised emotion. Here is the list of minimum functionality that
emotion rules need to satisfy:


Emotion Reaction: Emotion Reaction rules are responsible to appraise immediate
emotion responses to received events. In our model we chose to follow the OCC
approach model by using tags such as desirability, desirability for other,
praiseworthiness, etc.



Updating Interpersonal Relations: The agent interpersonal relationship affinity level
is updated based on appraised emotion.



Action Tendency: Action tendencies refer to a group of actions that are agent
impulses toward an external event. Action tendency is placed in the emotion section
because they are a direct result of the agent emotion response to an external event.
Action tendencies are If-then-else rules that can be applied once the appraised
emotion has passed its threshold, for example crying when one is extremely sad or
punching the attacker right away.



Goal based: At each update if the goal state has been reached the agent may
generate satisfaction/fear-confirmed or relief /disappointment. Goal based rules
need an interface to the agent role to be informed of all goals and their last stored
state in the agent.



Updating Emotional State: Apprised emotions from a perceived event update the
agent Emotional State.

The main reason that we distinguish between different groups of emotion rules is their
functionality and their interface with other agent’s modules. Although emotion rules are
the same, the architecture provides the flexibility to customize emotion responses through
personality traits in the role architecture. This customization brings diversity to our
agents’ emotion expression as well as making each individual behavior situated in its
social context.
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3.4

Memory

Memory and, in particular, the ability to remember previous experiences have not been
explicitly mentioned in the literature as a requirement for a believable agent, but a
socially-aware agent without memory does not make much sense. Many believability
requirements from Loyall such as: social relationship and consistency of experience
would need a memory as well. An agent should be able to remember and preferably
learn from past experiences, not repeating the same mistakes over and over again, which
easily breaks the audience’s immersion. The TOM module in Memory works as a
learning engine which interprets received events based on predefined traits to complete
other actors’ profiles.
Once the agent has experienced a particular event it should be able to remember that
event with its associated emotional affect. If this emotional effect is positive, the agent
may develop a tendency to pick the same option in future. In the case of a negative
emotional effect, the agent avoids the situation or picks a different option. For example, if
the agent is looking for a social activity and one option is to spend time with a group of
people who have bullied the agent before, and the other option is to go to a movie with a
friend, hanging out with bullies while the agent has not enjoyed their company in the past
is not an optimal choice.
One of the main functions of Memory module is to help the agent remember what has
happened, and adding learning to this feature increases the agent’s knowledge based on
world dynamics. It is necessary for a socially-believable agent to develop causal
reasoning for others’ actions and current events. For example, when the agent needs to
maximize its utility based on interaction with others, trusting an unreliable agent several
times illustrates an inability to learn about that agent’s personality.
Fundamentally learning from past experiences enables the agent to predict the future,
which consequently rescues him from repeating the same mistakes, particularly during
social interaction with others. An agent who observes the same pattern of behavior from
the same agent a few times should, eventually, be able to pick up the associated
personality trait present in the observed agent. For example, if Bob observes violent
44

actions from Sue previously, he develops knowledge that, in general, she has a tendency
towards performing violent actions.
TOM is not exclusive in only storing other agents’ personality traits; it also enhances an
agent’s strategies over time. A utility-based approach, hand-in-hand with learning, makes
the agent a more proficient planner due to the fact that he is not blindly looking for
maximizing his utility but also taking into account uncertainty and other agents’ actions.
For example, if an agent’s goal is to earn as much money as possible, more money means
higher utility. When the only way to gain profit is trading their goods with other actors in
the environment, Memory enables the agent to find out what are the most profitable
trades, as well as the most profitable trading partner. The task of finding the best trader
cannot be done unless the agent could remember previous interaction with others.

Figure 3.6: Overview of Memory module.
Our Memory functionalities can be categorized into three main groups:


Current World State: Active Memory consists of all facts that the agent knows
about the current state of the world. Memory is responsible to update these facts
upon perceiving new events. Keeping track of the current world state is necessary
for the agent planning process and action selection and also validating the planning
tree that is now in the Memory.
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History of Events: The main and very basic functionality of the Memory component
is to record all observed events in Memory Cells associated with their emotional
affect (if they have one).



Theory of Mind: The main premise of theory of mind is that how we act depends
not only on the immediate effect of our action but also on how we believe others
will react [13]. In the same article, Sally [13] describes different reasoning levels,
suggesting that a 0th-level reasoning is exemplified when an individual only
considers their immediate desires, beliefs and traits, while a 1st-level reasoner
expects others to act with regard to their own desires and beliefs, and consider
others in their planning.
The concept of theory of mind (TOM) has a long history in psychology. However,
in the field of believable agents there are very few models which use this powerful
concept to enhance agent planning. FATiMa, with its double appraisal process and
Psychsim, by introducing the appraisal theory of mind, are among these models.
Pure decision theory approaches are conventional methods for decision making in
multi-agent systems. Their biggest drawback is that they do not take into account
preferences of others. Humans, in their day-to-day decision, naturally make use of
each other’s’ mental models. For example, in a competition, or while compromising
on a deal, dismissing the fact that other parties involved have their own set of
priorities leaves the decision maker with a semi-optimal outcome. TOM facilitates
the prediction of this factor and implicates it in agent decision-making equations.
TOM enables the agent to recognize other’s patterns of behavior. To implement this
feature, one option is to provide the agent with exact mental models of other agents,
such as emotional state, roles, and associated personality traits. Although the
mentioned method removes the computational burden, it does not have any parallel
case in humans. We chose a more realistic approach by enabling the agent to
recognize other agents’ patterns of behavior and to make predictions in a trial-anderror process with their incomplete model.
The TOM component is a critical feature in the agent planning process, since it not
only determines the desirability of states or actions from other agents’ points of
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view, but also uses these elements to deal with the uncertainty of other’s action
during planning.
In order to perform all of the above general functionalities, Memory consists of two main
parts. The first one is a data structure to store events and other agents’ profiles, and the
second part is a processing unit which manipulates these data structures and coordinates
them with other modules such as role and planning.

3.4.1

Memory Structure

Memory structure includes four different components that store received data: Active
Memory, Planning Tree, Event History, and TOM as illustrated in Figure 3.6.

3.4.1.1

Active Memory

Active Memory consists of all of the facts, and their associated values, that the agent
knows about the current state of the world. The agent perception mechanism, by
definition, is open world assumption or OWA, meaning that those facts which the agent
does not know will have their values considered unknown rather than false. The world
and value of each fact is independent of the observer, and these values become known as
the agent discovers the world through exploration.
The agent knows as much about the world as it has seen or been told through received
messages. Interestingly, a group of agents can have different, or even contradicting, facts
in their Active Memory, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. In each update, the agent saves the
most recent state in its Active Memory and removes facts with differing values following
each update. Furthermore, the agent does not have access to other agents’ active
memories; the only way that one agent’s knowledge can be shared is through the agent
voluntarily distributing them.
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Figure 3.7: Two agents’ active memories can have a different value for facts.

3.4.1.2

Planning Tree

If an agent decides to achieve a goal, the agent will generate a plan that is a sequence of
actions to achieve it. The planning process will be discussed thoroughly in Section 3.7.
The result of this process is a sequence of actions that will be kept in the Memory. Each
time the Active Memory is updated, the next action in the sequence will be checked for
validity. The action is valid if all of its preconditions are satisfied. If a received event
makes the stored plan invalid, the agent needs to consider re-planning.

3.4.1.3

Event History

Event History is an array of Memory Cells, each of which has two separate components:
Event and Emotional Effect as illustrated in Figure 3.8. Each Memory Cell can be linked
to a profile in TOM, or one of the agent roles. The mechanism of this connection will be
discussed shortly.
After the perception unit filters relevant events and passes them to Memory, the event
needs to fulfill at least one of the criteria below for it to be stored in Memory:
1. Emotionally Significant: In order to be emotionally significant the event should
be related to either the agent, or one of its roles, targets, or goals. Furthermore it
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should appraise an emotion in the agent. If the emotional impact of an event
makes the agent regulate its relationship with others, i.e. causes any change in the
agent’s affinity towards them, a Memory Cell will be linked to that role as
discussed in Section 3.3.

Figure 3.8: Memory Cell components in the Event History
2. Informative: An event is informative if it adds new information about other
agents’ states or confirms a previously-observed trait. For example, a total
stranger who walks past the agent on a side walk will not occupy the agent’s
attention for more than few seconds. However, if the agent were to be witness to a
bank robbery or a violent act, their attention will be occupied for much longer
presumably. What should be counted as an informative event, then, depends on
the scenario, belief system, and what aspects of other agents’ personality are
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important enough to be saved in Memory. For example, the designer can define a
thief by following set of rules:
Grabbing(X, Y) = True
Own (Z, X) =True
Z! =Y
=>
Thief (Y) =True
By having the above rules in the belief module, if the agent cares about recognizing
a thief, and it receives an event which confirms a robbery, that event will be saved
in the Memory. Each Memory Cell may have a pointer to one or more profiles in
TOM which helps the agent remember what made them update a trait value in a
profile. This mechanism enables the agent to revise their Memory upon receiving
new facts. Bob may tag Sue as a thief while she is driving a red Ferrari but later, if
he realizes that it was her father’s car which she had borrowed, he may modify his
previous judgment of her.
1. Request for Re-Planning: If an event forces the agent to update or change their plan,
the event will be saved in a Memory Cell. This category may or may not generate
emotion in the agent.

3.4.1.4

TOM

Theory of mind (TOM) enables an agent to take the preferences and personalities of other
actors into account in their decision-making and interaction. TOM consists of an array of
profiles that formalize an agent’s knowledge about other actors. There are two
approaches to provide the agent with the mental model of other agents as illustrated in
Figure 3.9: a) the designer authors profiles; or b) the agent updates profiles according to
received actions. Both approaches result in taking other agents’ profiles into account.
Updating profiles is more realistic; however, it is a process of trial and error.
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Additionally, it demands that the agents become engaged in many interactions for its final
model to become similar to the other agents’ personalities. On the other hand, authoring
is a fast and straightforward method that is necessary when agents need to know each
other in advance (for example for story reasons) but there has been no prior game
execution to permit the generation or updating of TOM within the game, in such a case
pre-authoring is the only way for the agents to have the proper TOM. Authoring enables
the designers to take control over the story as they can specify exactly what one agent
thinks of another agent.

Figure 3.9: TOM module with two options for pre-authoring and learning
Ideally, an agent needs a knowledge base and some type of ontology system to interpret
other agents’ personalities based on actions. Such interpretation is used to predict future
situations. However, using an ontology system puts a heavy burden on the system’s
performance. This burden encourages us to use action tagging that has been described
earlier in Section 3.2.2 for the recognition of other agents’ personalities.
Action tags can be as simple as ‘good/bad’ or ‘moral/immoral’, for example. In our
architecture, the type and variety of tags completely depends on the designer and what
they are looking for from an agent’s personality according to a scenario. For example, in
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simulating bullying in school, slapping someone can be tagged with ‘violent’, ‘bully’,
and ‘bad temper’. The observer of an action uses these tags to update the profiles of
actors involved in the action. For example, if Kathy slapped Sue and Joe saw it, he will
change Kathy’s profile based on slap tags. Our model is flexible in a way that it can be
used to implement any personality model such as OCEAN, as long as the designer
provides a consistent mapping from traits to actions. In a given state with a set of
available actions, TOM finds their priority based on the actor’s profile and actions’ tags.

3.4.2

Memory Functions

Memory functions are responsible for creating an interface between Memory modules
and other agent components as it has been illustrated in Figure 3.10. Upon receiving an
event from the emotion module, these functions filter the event independently and make
the necessary changes by coordinating with other agent modules. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.1. Note that all received events from the perception module will be passed to
both the emotion and Memory modules.


Updating Active Memory: Upon receiving a message, it will be checked for
consistency with Active Memory and values will get updated. These updates may
cause the agent to revise their plans.



Re-Planning: If the new world state makes the agent’s previously generated plans
invalid, the current world state will be sent to the agent planning section.



Updating Event History: If the event appraises an emotion, it will be recorded in a
Memory Cell. This process works as a filter. It checks the message and, as soon as
it satisfies one of the mentioned conditions, it is qualified. If the event is
emotionally-significant, the generated emotion will be saved as well as the event.



Updating Profiles: Action tags help the agent to update the actor TOM profile. It is
important to remember that not all actions have a tag. If the action has a tag then the
agent will update a performer profile. Walking is not a significant action; however,
stabbing someone is significant in identifying the other person’s personality. More
interestingly, the agent profile is not necessarily accurate, since the agent only saves
their own interpretation of the other actor’s action(s).
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Calculate Action Probability: The agent can pass a group of available actions and a
potential actor to the TOM module in order to calculate the probability of their
successful execution of those actions based on their own and the other actor’s
profile.

Figure 3.10: General overview of the Memory

3.5

Role

Role theory defines a role as the relationship of one person to another person, group or
object. It formalizes an agent’s relationship with its environment and with other agents,
including other agents’ expectations based on this relationship. Acton identifies a role as
a concept that can channel this formalization through belief, desire, and intention [56].
You defines a role as a coherent set of standard behavior, actions, norms, values, and
goals in his model [57].
Roles store agent information that is bound to social context in which the role target is
situated. There is one exception to this, namely, default roles that have no target and are
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always active; this will be discussed in detail below. The role structure defines the
relationship of an agent with the role target. This formalization defines the role’s
influence on agent behavior when the role is active. The complete structure of roles is
summarized in Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.11: Role’s components


Name: Each role has a unique name, such as mother, friend, secretary, or boss.



Personality Traits: Each role stores zero or more personality traits. This allows
active roles to contribute to the expression of agent personality traits. A default role
contains the core personality traits.



Target: Roles may store a particular target, but this is not necessary (i.e. target-free
roles can be defined; default roles are an example of this). Role targets may be an
agent, a group of agents or an object. For example, a mother role may target the
mother’s children, or a teacher role may target the teacher’s students.



Context: In addition to a target, roles may define a context—or series of facts—that
cause the role to be activated. For example, a secretary role may have no target, but
may be activated only when the agent is at its workplace
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Weight: Each role has a weight that identifies its importance. The degree of
influence of each role when multiple roles are active is determined by their relative
weights.



Beliefs: Roles may contain beliefs that influence the agent’s appraisal of events, the
world state, and action tags when the role is active. Our system has two belief
components: Reward System and World View. Reward System identifies
desirability of events and facts; World View provides a high level categorization for
actions.



Goals: Roles may store zero or more goals that are activated in the agent model
when the role becomes active. This allows roles to activate richer behavior than
simple reactions to the environment.

Our design dictates that all agents in the environment possess one or more roles,
including—minimally—a default role that defines the agent’s relationship to the
environment. The default role characterizes default agent behavior when no relevant
social context is influencing such behavior. In this way, the default role models contextfree elements of the agent’s beliefs, personality, and goals. For example, if Bob is usually
a greedy and impatient person (though these qualities may change in particular social
contexts) then greediness and impatience are formalized in Bob’s default role.
All non-default roles store a target, a context, or both. These elements define the
conditions under which the role should be activated, in the presence of the target, under
the conditions defined by the context, or a combination of both. For example, suppose
Bob is friends with Jake. Bob stores a friend role which contains the identity of Jake, as
its target; this friend role is activated during Bob’s planning process if the plan involves
Jake. The friend role also contains beliefs, personality traits, and goals associated with
Bob’s perspective of his friendship with Jake. In this way, non-default roles model a sort
of context-bound adjustment of how beliefs are activated, personality traits expressed,
and goals pursued in particular social contexts.
Our role-based architecture may assign multiple roles to the same agent as illustrated in
Figure 3.12; for example, Bob may be friends with Jake, he may be Sue’s husband, and
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Kathy’s boss. More interestingly, more than one of Bob’s roles can be active at the same
time; each active role stores its weight, which denotes its importance (and therefore
influence) in Bob’s planning process. Naturally, this may activate conflicting goals and
beliefs from different roles; such a case models Bob’s internal conflict in difficult social
situations. For example, Bob’s default role may strongly forbid killing another human
being, but when a soldier role is activated he may be compelled to kill his enemies.
During a battle, Bob experiences a conflict between his normative moral code and his
duty as a soldier as the two roles compete to determine his propensity for lethal violence.

Figure 3.12: The agent can have multiple roles.
Our Role-based architecture has several advantages:


Reusability: Once a role has been defined it can be reused for different agents. For
example, a guardian role can be defined for all mothers and father relationships in a
game environment. Furthermore, basic design patterns such as class-based or
prototype-based inheritance can be applied to generate specializations of general
roles, such as a mother role and father role derived from the basic principles of a
guardian role.



Customizability: Designers are at liberty to customize: (a) the structure of
relationships that activate roles, (b) the structure of traits and goals stored within
roles, and (c) the prioritization of various roles and various traits within each role.



Understandability: The concept of roles based on social relationships can be easily
understood by non-experts; it is intuitive. One of the main problems with current
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agent architectures is that they employ complicated, exotic modeling patterns that
are difficult for non-experts to understand.


Flexibility: Allowing agents to have several roles activated in different contexts
offers flexibility. For example, Sue can be a mother, teacher and wife, and only act
according to those roles when they are relevant to her social context.



Ease of social knowledge representation: Our architecture provides an easy
solution to import social knowledge to NPCs. The ability to define the
individualized reward system, norm, and value in a role empowers agents to
demonstrate social intelligence without using a complex ontology. For example,
Henry might frown upon cheating on an exam. As long as he can recognize what
“cheating” is in an exam context, he can avoid it.



Suitability for dramatic narratives: The ability to mix and match roles, and
customize them makes our role-based architecture a perfect choice to create
interactive drama.

3.5.1

Goal

Goal is a desirable state of world that consists of one or a conjunction of several facts.
OCC model identifies three types of goals: Active, Replenishment and Interest. Inspired
by OCC categorization, in our model all goals that can be accomplished by planning are
in the class of Replenishment goals; one Replenishment goal that the agent is currently
planning to accomplish is the active goal. However the agent can not directly take an
action to achieve Interest goals; they are usually presented by a static fact with
importance values. An example would be if Bob is fan of a football team, his team
winning the championship makes him happy but he could not do anything as a fan to
influence the match result.
The reason that an agent does not actively pursue an interest goal is either because a) the
agent does not have any control over their state, for example being betrayed by another
person in prisoner’s dilemma, or b) the agent role enforces a particular preference for one
world state over another, which is a factor that the agent needs to consider in the
planning. For example, seeing the happiness of a friend can be defined as an interest goal,
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which causes the agent to avoid a sequence of actions or have less utility for states that
would make this goal false. However one goal that has been defined as an interest for
one can be defined as Replenishment for the other.

3.5.1.1

Replenishment

In our architecture we define two classes of Replenishment goals: a) Story Concern b)
desire based. The nature of both categories is the same in a sense that they both produce
goal directed behavior. Story Concern goals drive the plot forward by compelling an
agent to achieve a specific world state. Desire based goals prevent agents from becoming
idle if they have no active goal in any of their currently active roles. Generally desire
based goals have a lower priority in comparison to Story Concern goals, which means if
there is an unsatisfied Story Concern goal the agent will not start planning to achieve a
desire based goal. The mechanism of this selection will be discussed further in the
intention recognition module.
Story Concern goals explicitly can be defined by the designer to create dilemma or a
specific scenario: for example in prisoner’s dilemma, Alex has the goal to spend fewer
years in prison. Once the agent completes a sequence of actions in a plan to achieve a
Story Concern goal, it will be discarded. On the other hand, desire based goals can be
used to represent repetitive but goal directed behavior; for example the agent gets
gradually hungry a few hours after its last portion of meal.
Dependent on the designer’s choice, Story Concern goals can be used as a mechanism to
dynamically determine the story path. The designer can provide multiple alternative
scenarios for different conditions of a Story Concern goal state and then, at runtime, the
goal final state causes the Event Handler to apply one of the alternative scenarios. This
alternative scenario can be applied by assigning a new role to the agent. For example, if
the agent Story Concern goal of getting married is accomplished successfully, a spouse
role will be assigned to the agent. Dynamic role assignment facilitates our model to be
integrated with a non-deterministic story narration, consequently makes our agent model
more efficient to be used in an interactive drama.
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a) Story Concern
Story Concern goals mainly can be used as a mechanism to lead the agent through the
story on the plot that the designer wants to simulate. The agent does not develop a desire
or an urge to achieve these goals; in each planning cycle the intention recognition module
chooses an unsatisfied Story Concern goal with the highest importance. The highest
important Story Concern goal will be determined by applying Formula (1) to all Story
Concern goals in the agent active roles and selecting the one with the highest value. In
Formula (1),
associated role and

is the importance of the Story Concern goal in its
( (

))is the importance of the role that Story Concern goal

belongs to in the agent’s current social context.
Formula (1):
( (

))

As soon as the agent achieves the final state in the plan to achieve the Story Concern
goal, the goal will become deactivated permanently. This class of goals can be used to
manage sub stories in the main plot, or managing the whole path of the story. For
example, in a family drama the agent can have several Story Concern goals such as:
getting married, buying a house, and having kids.
Here is a minimum structure to include Story Concern goals in the role structure:


Name: Each goal has a name to make it distinguishable from others.



Set of facts and their associated value: The goal world state is a conjunction of facts
that each can have a different importance in the agent reward system. For example
in the prisoner’s dilemma the goal state will be defined by number of years in
prison and outside of prison. One has negative valence and the other positive.



Importance: The goal importance determines priority; higher priority determines the
agent urgency to achieve the goal sooner. Goal importance helps the designer to
create a meaningful sequence of milestones in the agent life span.
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Activation Status: Activation status will be used to check if the agent has already
achieved the goal in the environment or not. Story Concern goals become
deactivated and discarded after they are achieved.

The importance of Story Concern goal will be determined by applying Formula (1) to all
active roles’ Story Concern goals
b) Desire based
The agent should make a plan to achieve a desire based goal in the same manner as Story
Concern goals. However, unlike Story Concern goals which are discarded once they have
been achieved. Desire based goals need a mechanism to ensure that the agent develops a
desire to achieve these goals again after the most recent fulfillment, as illustrated in
Figure 3.13. A Decay rate variable in the desire based goal structure ensures that the
agent develops an intention over time to achieve a desire based goal again. The presence
of desire based goals prevents the agent from wandering around in the environment
without any purposeful behavior, they also provide a great potential to represent the
quality of being resource bounded in agents. Desire based goals can be used to embed
needs or general routines in the agent. Their nature in directing agent motive has been
inspired by Reiss 16 motive personality model that has been discussed in Section 2.3.1.2.
If the agent does not have any Story Concern goal left, the intention process begins
evaluating desire based goals to choose one with the highest urgency. The urgency
(importance) of each desire based goal has a direct correlation with the difference
between its current value and threshold as well as its importance that drives from
Formula 2. In this formula

( (

to.

(

,

,

the agent role that

)) is the weight of role that

belongs

) are threshold, current value and weight of

belongs to. More distance and higher importance indicate a

higher urgency to achieve the goal.
Formula (2):
( (

))
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Figure 3.13: The agent desirability to achieve the goal increases as the current value
decreases (due to decay rate)
The minimum set of variables for this class of goals is listed below:


Name: Each goal has a name like: hunger, socializing.



World State: Replenishment goals only will be defined with one fact.



Range: Each goal has a valid range; this can be visualized with a tank that the agent
needs to fill.



Current Value: Is a current state of the goal according to the agent interactions in
the world until a precise moment.



Threshold: Threshold is a number in the goal valid range that the agent should
minimally achieve to feel satisfied. This number varies depending on the agent
personality. For example, a greedy person has a high threshold for gaining money.



Importance: The goal importance will be determined by motivational trait of
personality. Goal importance will be used in intention recognition to set the agent
next goal.



Decay rate: It determines the goal decay rate and makes sure that the agent starts
planning for the goal after a period of time. For example, if Bob satisfies his hunger
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by eating food, sooner or later, depending on this decay rate, he feels the urge to
satisfy his hunger again.

3.5.1.2

Interest Goal

Interest goal is a group of goals that the agent does not actively plan to achieve. Unlike
the first two classes of goals, Interest goal consists of only one Boolean fact and
associated value. The goal state can be calculated based on non-Boolean continuous
variables but the assigned value should be represented by true or false. For example, if
the agent happiness has been defined as an IBG it still can be a function of several factors
in the environment; however its representation as an IBG is either true or false. IBGs are
facts in the world and based on their valence the agent either tries to preserve or avoid
them, without explicitly planning to achieve them. For example if Alice is Bob’s enemy,
she may have the goal to see Bob unhappy (happiness (Bob) = false). This makes any
state that Bob is unhappy more desirable for Alice. However, Alice will not make a plan
explicitly to make Bob upset when Bob’s sadness is her Interest goal. Our model has the
flexibility to define the same goal as an Interest for one agent while the other agent
considers it as a Replenishment goal. Another example is when the agent cannot make
any impact on its desired goal state, such as the prisoner’s dilemma where the agent can
have a goal of not being betrayed. Regardless of how important this goal is to the agent,
practically there is nothing that he can do to avoid being betrayed. But in his planning
tree evaluation any state that he has being betrayed has a low desirability.
In the planning process the agent considers Interest goals; a state that preserves or
contains Interest goals with positive importance has a higher desirability, whereas the
agent avoids states that contain Interest goals with negative importance. This desirability
naturally applies to the agent processing by state utility calculation. Finally this makes the
agent develop a preference to take action in the path towards particular states and to
avoid others.
For Replenishment goals there is a valid range and a threshold to indicate their level of
achievement. However, IBGs state follows true/false principles, and there is nothing in
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between. This makes the agent to only appraise emotion if the IBG state changes in
comparison to the very last recorded state.
To achieve all these requirements, Interest goals need to have following variables:


Name: Each goal has a name to make it distinguishable from others.



World State and the associated value: Each goal has a fact and its associated
value. As we have mentioned an IBG should only contain a Boolean fact.



Importance: The goal importance is a positive or negative numerical value in a
valid range.



Last Status: The IBG emotion affect depends on its last stored status.

3.5.2

Personality Traits

Personality unifies all human behavior, temperaments, and mental traits. Human beings
each have their own preferences and traits that affect decision making unconsciously. In
the field of game and interactive drama, it is challenging to find one model that could
reflect all aspects of the agent personality. OCEAN and Myers-Briggs both suffer from
lack of deliberative goal selection and accurate mapping between traits and cognitive
process. Alternatively, Reiss’s model solely focused on deliberative goal seeking, doesn’t
give an explanation of reactive behaviors or effect of personality traits on emotion
generation.
One of the biggest practical obstacles when borrowing a personality model from
psychology is to define a well-defined mapping from traits to actions. Assigning multiple
traits to the agent by itself does not create a personality for NPCs. Lack of an accurate
mapping makes the personality model a doll mask that does not unify agent attitudes.
Our proposed solution to make personality traits more practical is to break them down
into 3 general categories and provide an appropriate interface from each category to the
agent component. There are three groups of personality trait in our model: Reactive,
Behavioral and Context Free. Reactive personality traits affect how the agent appraised
an event (they can override an Emotion Trait threshold) or how Emotion Trait should be
integrated in an Emotional State. Behavioral Traits explicitly represent the agent
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tendency or avoidance toward performing an action with certain attribute. Context Free
Traits are mainly used in long shot decision-making such as planning.

3.5.2.1

Reactive Traits

The Emotion section defines all Emotion Traits and rules for emotion reactions, their
integration to Emotional State Dimension and action tendencies. Motivation to define this
class of personality traits is to define a way to customize each agent emotion responses.
This customized reaction should be preserved in the agent life span as a consistent pattern
of behavior.
The main functionality of the emotion module is to create a more believable agent by
facilitating appropriate emotion responses through applying predefined rules. However,
appraisal of the exact same emotion response toward one stimulus from different agents
is as unbelievable as absence of emotion.
This class of personality traits affects the agent in one of the following ways:


Adjusting Threshold: The Emotion Trait’s threshold can be overridden to a higher
or a lower degree depending on whether the agent is either more prone or has a high
tolerance to a certain stimulus. For example a Person with a low tolerance
(threshold) for anger becomes angry easier.



Mapping Emotion: In the emotion module all agents follow the same set of rules for
emotion appraisal. However in real life being exposed to the same event does not
necessarily affect everyone in the same way. This attribute links one trait to another
one.

Personality should unify an agent through all steps in its performance. Once these traits
have been defined in the agent role, they work as a permanent filter on top of emotion
rules in the role context. Separation of reactive traits from the emotion component and
emotion model provides the flexibility to change any part independent from another.

3.5.2.2

Behavioral Traits

Behavioral traits make the agent represent a consistent pattern of action selection.
Personality traits in this part are the same as tags that the designer has previously used in
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action tagging. The designer can use any personality model or action categorization that
he or she prefers, as long as tags have a meaningful connection to the action.
One of the fundamental factors in decision making is the agent behavioral traits exhibited
when the agent is facing several available actions. This class of personality traits makes
the agent not only represents goal directed behavior but also to prefer certain actions over
others according to a consistent pattern of behavior in correlation with the agent social
context or a set of active roles. For example, a friendship role demands the agent execute
a more cooperative behavior even if he is not a very cooperative person in general. One
behavioral trait can be defined in several roles; in decision making the agent uses the
action context to find the most related role to formalize its behavior.
In addition to the trait degree, the trait weight also impacts the decision making. More
dominant traits in the agent role will be represented with a higher weight. Figure 3.14
represents how an agent facing two different actions has a greater tendency to choose one
action over the other based on his role personality traits.
The general structure for personality traits minimally needs the following components:


Name: for each personality trait there should be an action tag with the same name.
This enables the agent to use action tags in decision making.



Value: Each personality trait has degrees that indicate the agent adherence to the
trait. An agent can have a cooperation trait in his role as a friend and also in his
default role but each with a different degree. This makes the agent more
cooperative in one role in comparison to the other.



Importance: Importance value determines the trait dominance in the agent action
selection.
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Figure 3.14: The agent behavioral trait.
In Figure 3.14, A is the most desirable action because T1 and T2 are the only traits in the
action and their values are exactly the same as the one authored in the agent. In the
absence of A, the agent needs to make a choice between C and B, which makes C the
most desirable one. C and B both have the same accumulative difference for T1 and T2;
however the trait’s weight is another factor in calculating action desirability. T1 has a
higher weight in comparison to T2, which makes C the more desirable action.

3.5.2.3

Context Free Traits

Context Free Traits can only can be defined in the agent default role. Their application
and functionality is fixed and is independent from the agent social context. Context Free
Traits are factors that affect the agent planning process explicitly. Care of consequence is
an example of this category of traits; in state utility assignment an agent always has the
same care of consequences in weighting its own utility against others. Context Free Traits
can include qualities such as risk aversion or utility directed behavior.
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3.5.3

Belief

Beliefs are mental attitudes characterizing how the world is viewed through the agent eye
or a particular role. Beliefs determine how one should interpret events, world states, as
well as actions. In our design belief is a very powerful component for encoding common
sense knowledge into the agent architecture without using an ontology system. It
facilitates the agent to evaluate the world state according to its roles. It also helps the
agent to develop a more general categorization of actions independent from their tags and
post conditions. The belief component consists of two main parts: Reward System and
World view.

3.5.3.1

Reward System

As we have mentioned each world and goal state has a set of facts. Meanwhile based on a
scenario there can be several facts that have not been included in the agent goals.
However, the agent may encounter these facts and it will be considered vital from the
believability perspective to demonstrate an appropriate reaction. In the social interaction
the agent may not have any goal that defines happiness as a desirable state, but upon
seeing its friend’s happiness it should be able to at least understand the valence and
desirability of this state. The reward system is the set of facts with their associated
importance that the designer authors according to the agent characteristic and possible
situation in a scenario. The Reward system plays a vital role in leaf evaluation that will
be discussed in Section 3.7.2.1. The agent determines desirability of facts targeting other
agents by filtering them through its own rewards system.

3.5.3.2

World View

World view provides the agent with a high categorization of actions. For example the
agent can categorize cheating, lying to a friend, and betrayal in the group of immoral
actions. This categorization enables the agent to develop a higher level of knowledge
about others social behavior independent from action tags or post conditions. This higher
knowledge enables the agent to make more accurate prediction in its TOM. If the agent
wants to predict the next action of its opponent and traits in its opponents profile are not
helpful in predicting the next probable action. The solution is to compare previously
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performed action categories of the opponent with available actions. If an agent has been
acting in a certain category, it has a high tendency to choose future actions from the same
category. For example if Alice saw Bob helping a stranger, she identifies him as being
more willing to perform actions from the same category (Like: being kind or honest) in
future. Figure 3.15 is a schematic illustration of this module.

Figure 3.15: Schematic view of the Agent World view.

3.6

Intention Recognition

The Intention Recognition Module processes the planning agent’s roles and the current
world state, and chooses one candidate goal to be the active goal—i.e., the intention—to
be pursued by the planning agent. The agent can have multiple Replenishment goals in
each active role, but at the same time he only pursues achieving one of them, the active
goal. The Intention Recognition Module follows process (1) to select an intention from
the agent’s goals.
The process bellows first attempts to find the Story Concern goal with the highest priority
among all active roles. If there was not any Story Concern goal available it will check
active role for the Desire Based goal with the highest priority.
Process (1):
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Declaration:
Roles = Set {Set {<i, ActivePursueGoals, ReplenishmentGoals>}}
The set of roles associated with the planning agent, expressed as a tuple of
role importance (i), active pursue goals, and Replenishment goals
StoryBasedGoal = Set { set <f, i>, p}
The set of the planning agent’s Story Concern goals expressed as a tuple
of the goal facts and their associated importance set <f, i>, and the goal
priority (p)
DesireBasedGoal = Set {< f, i, p> }
The set of the planning agent’s desire based goals expressed as a tuple of
the goal fact (f), the goal importance (i), and the goal priority (p)
ActiveRoles(SetOfRoles, StateOfTheWorld)
Return the subset of SetOfRoles that are active given the
StateOfTheWorld
HighestPriorityDesireBasedGoal (SetOfRoles)
Return a desire based goal in Role’s set of goals that has greater or equal
priority with respect to all other Replenishment goals in Role
HighestImportanceStoryBasedGoal(Role)
Return a Story Concern goal in Role’s set of goals that has greater or equal
importance with respect to all other Story Concern goals in the agent active Roles.
The Actual intention recognition Process:
IntentionRecognition(Roles, WorldState):
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CurrentlyActiveRoles:= ActiveRoles(Roles, WorldState)
If CurrentlyActiveRoles = nil
Return nil
Else
ActiveGoal:= HighestImportanceStoryBasedGoal
(CurrentlyActiveRoles)
If CandidateGoal = Nil
CandidateGoal:= HighestPriorityDesireBasedGoal
(CurrentlyActiveRoles)
Return CandidateGoal
The Intention Recognition Module first activates high importance Story Concern goals,
and then resorts to high priority Desire Based goals only when there are no Story
Concern goals to activate. Note that although in process(1) the importance of Story
Concern and desire based goals are modeled as variables in fact they drives from
Formula(1) and Formula(2). In the intention recognition active roles, and their weight has
been applied through using two mentioned formulas that make the agent active role to be
selected based on active roles. The candidate goal, or intention, will be selected by the
Intention Recognition Module and will be passed to the Planning Module.

3.7

Planning

After intention recognition, the agent starts planning. Planning consists of searching for a
sequence of actions—called a plan—that results in a goal state. Agent planning has two
phases; in the first phase the agent acquires a planning tree either by building one or
retrieving one that was pre-authored for the situation. In the second phase it traverses the
tree to find the best plan among all possible plans. The planning tree should not be
confused with the planning agent’s plan; a planning tree is a tree of potential action
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possibilities, whereas a plan is a sequence of actions that lead to a planning agent’s goal
state.
The planning process starts by receiving the active goal from the intention recognition
module and ends with a plan—sequence of actions—that the agent needs to perform to
achieve the goal. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.16. We will first briefly discuss
construction of the planning tree, and then discuss different types of nodes in the
planning tree as well as processing steps performed by agents that are peculiar to each
node type.

Figure 3.16: General overview of planning process.

3.7.1

Acquiring Planning Tree

The Acquiring Planning Tree module receives two inputs: (a) the intention from the
Intention Recognition Module, and (b) the initial state of all agents in the planning
agent’s environment. Unsurprisingly, the Acquiring Planning Tree outputs a planning
tree. The initial state of an agent includes its Emotional State, active agent roles, and the
current state of the world. The planning tree output by this module is a simulation of the
world environment that consists of world state and various action sequences that lead to
goal satisfaction.
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Note, however, that degree of goal satisfaction may vary; that is, a particular sequence of
actions that lead to a goal state (i.e., a particular traversal of a completed planning tree)
may be more or less satisfying to the planning agent than another such sequence. This
“multiple solutions” property of planning trees makes planning tree evaluation (described
later) a crucial part of the planning process.
The design of the planning tree evaluation process imposes some constraints on the
structure of planning trees. Branches descending from planning tree nodes model
potential actions and/or consequences of actions committed by agents. The existence of a
branch must be consistent with a simulated world state that corresponds to the
combination of (a) the initial world state input to the Planning Tree Generator, and (b)
additional and/or modified state that arises from applying all actions and consequences
corresponding to traversing the planning tree from its root to the node from which the
branch descends. Put another way, each branch must represent a valid “next action or
consequence” in the series of actions and consequences modeled by the unique traversal
from the root node to the node from which the branch descends. Planning trees are
composed of the following elements:
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Figure 3.17: General planning tree.
Decision nodes: These are internal nodes with descending branches that represent
different potential actions that could be chosen by the planning agent according to the
simulated world state (Node type A in Figure 3.17)
Non-decision nodes: These are internal nodes with descending branches that represent
one of two things depending on the meaning of the branch that connects the non-decision
node to its parent. If the branch represents an action that has multiple consequences, then
the branches descending from the non-decision node represent the set of potential
consequences associated with the action as illustrated in Figure 3.17 by node type C.
Otherwise, the branches descending from the non-decision node represent potential
actions that could be taken by agents other than the planning agent, which is represented
with node type B in the same figure.
Leaf nodes: Ideally, leaf nodes represent goal states with respect to the planning agent’s
intention. Leaf nodes store the full set of facts that correspond to the sequence of actions
and consequences modeled by the unique path from the root node to the leaf. Leaf nodes
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that do not correspond to goal states only exist in the event that the Planning Tree
Generator was not able to find any paths from the world state to a goal state. The facts
stored in a leaf describe the set of post-conditions applied by all actions in the path from
the initial state till the current leaf node.
The only constraints on planning trees as a whole are that the root node must be a
decision node and the tree must be of finite height.
There are at least two potential approaches to provide the agent with the planning tree: (a)
choosing a template plan from a planning repository, (b) generating the planning tree.
Both approaches result in a planning tree with the same structure that the agent can use in
the second phase.
Choosing between these two alternatives entails a tradeoff between (a) time vs. space
complexity, and (b) development effort. In the first case, a plan repository may require a
large amount of storage, but plan retrieval will be faster than generation because it will
consist of a simple query to the repository. In the second case, the developer must weigh
the effort required to develop a sufficiently complete repository against the effort
required to produce an adequate planning tree generation algorithm for discovering plans
that are likely to lead to goal satisfaction in a finite number of steps.
The first option mentioned above is to use a planning repository that can be provided to
the agent offline by an expert or a designer. A planning repository is indexed by the
initial state(s) and goal state(s) associated with each planning tree. Producing a planning
tree is then a matter of matching inputs with appropriate index entries and output one of
the planning templates.
The second option is to generate the planning tree each time the agent aims to achieve a
goal based on the initial state. This approach is more flexible to be applied in dynamic
environments like games. As it has been discussed in Chapter 2 one of the main
motivations to design believable agents is failure of classic methods in facing
unpredictable situations. Generating the planning tree at runtime addresses this problem
by considering initial and possible intermediate states. A plausible solution to this
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problem is to apply forward chaining from the world state in search of a goal state. By
design, each world state includes set of atomic facts that have an assigned numerical or
Boolean value; every action is a name coupled with pre- and post-conditions—facts with
predetermined values; and actions with more than one post-condition will only yield one
of the post-conditions at runtime. By repeatedly applying actions as functions that map a
world state containing the necessary pre-conditions to one or more new world states—
each containing a post-condition—the Planning Tree Generator can track its simulated
world state and construct a valid planning tree.
This approach can be combined with an admissible heuristic that produces a subset of
available actions that could lead to a goal state. The designer can define these admissible
heuristics based on system criteria. Because the agent should be able to perform the
planning in real-time, putting time constraints on the planning tree generation is a rational
option. This time constraint prevents the agent from staying long enough in an idle state
during planning to break the audience immersion. Depending on other parts of system
requirements, limiting the planning tree by number of CPU cycles and memory usage is
another applicable heuristic in order to prevent other system’s processes from starvation
while the agent planning is using all the resources. The designer can also put a limit on
the depth of the planning tree; this means if the goal could not be achieved within a
certain depth the agent drops the planning tree generation. Lastly the designer can keep
the branching factor not to exceed more than a certain number. These admissible
heuristics can help to limit the risk of dealing with a potentially very large planning tree.
Naturally, nodes that have reached a goal state are stored as leaves and not expanded.
Since planning trees must be of finite height, tree generation can abort after some number
of iterations chosen by the implementer. The tree is then either (a) pruned such that all
leaves correspond to goal states, or (b) left “un pruned” as the algorithm failed to find any
paths from the current world state to a goal state. Such a tree construction algorithm
allows the agent to turn planning into a path finding problem, seeking a path from the
current world state to a goal state, or to “the best non-goal state” in the case that no such
path exists in the planning tree.
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3.7.2

Selecting an alternative: Processing a planning tree

After the planning tree has been generated in the first phase, the agent must select a
plan—a sequence of actions described by a top-down traversal from the root to a leaf.
The first step in selecting a plan is to visit all the tree nodes and annotate them with a
utility value based on (1) the node type, (2) the planning agent’s roles; (3) the planning
agent’s embedded personality traits, (4) the planning agent’s reward system, and (5)
annotations of descendent nodes (6) the planning agent’s TOM profile that has been
discussed in Section 3.4.1.4. As such, the agent visits nodes bottom-up, breadth-first.
The planning tree contains three different types of nodes that have been briefly
mentioned in the planning generation section. The annotation process for each node type
is described below.

3.7.2.1

Leaf

Leaf nodes are nodes with no descendants. Each leaf in the planning tree contains one or
more facts that correspond to all sequences of the unique action leads to this node from
the initial state. All actions’ consequences leading to a leaf node will be presented in the
leaf node, so the agent performs the state utility only once and it evaluate action
consequence within a path and not individually.
Facts in each leaf may be categorized into the following two disjoint sets: a) facts that are
members of the planning agent’s interest-based goals or the active goal and b) facts that
are not members of the planning agent’s interest-based goals or the active goal and they
do not target the agent as it has been illustrated in Figure 3.18. We differentiate between
these two sets because the agent follows two different processes to evaluate them (one for
each set). Leaf utility is calculated by Formula (3), where
consequence,

is the agent self-desirability and

Formula (3):
∑
76

is the agent care of

is other desirability.

Figure 3.18: The agent processing facts related to its goals

A) Self-Desirability
Self-Desirability determines the level of leaf desirability based on its
determined facts value that is: 1) in the agent goal scope. The agent goal
scope for each planning tree includes all the planner agent active roles’
Interest goals and the active goal. The goal scope excludes other
Replenishment goals in the planner agent active roles in order to put the focus
of leaf utility calculation in the planning tree on evaluating facts only related
to one specific goal. 2) Targets the agent. Facts that can be categorized in one
of the above categories will be applied to Formula (4) Self-Desirability
considers role and agent reward system in its calculation. The importance of a
certain fact is not necessarily the same for two different agents. Due to the
open world assumption the agent cannot make any assumption about
unknown fact values. As such, the agent only evaluates facts with known
values based on Formula (4).
Formula (4):
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∑
For evaluating facts related to the active goal of the planning or those that
target the agent, Formula (4) is sufficient.

is a desirability of a fact

based on the agent active roles’ reward system. Generally the agent uses
Formula (5) to calculate a weighted average for a given fact based on the
agent active roles. In Formula (5)
role

reward system and

(

)is the desirability of fact

in the

( ) is the importance of role .

Formula (5):
∑

(

)

( )

In the case of interest-based goals there is an additional step. The agent
compares each interest-based goal state with its state in the initial node, and it
only applies Formula (4) if the goal state got changed in the planning process,
the reason and how this evaluation takes place has been explained in Section
3.5.1.2.
B) Other Desirability
Other desirability is a metric to evaluate all facts that are not either in the
agent goal scope or does not target it. Despite Self-Desirability; other
desirability is utility consideration for part of the world state in the leaf that is
not related to the planning agent through its roles.

78

Figure 3.19: Other-Desirability from agent A perspective
Figure 3.19 illustrates agent A evaluating “samplefact” that targets agent B by
applying Formula (6). Formula (6) applies A affinity (

) toward B as

a mediator for applying the desirability stored in A’s reward system for
were targeting A, (

if it

). I.e., A considers whether it would like to be (or is

rewarded by being) targeted by , and scales that desirability according to
how much it likes or dislikes (or how much it has affinity for) B. In this way,
measures of selfish reward and affinity are combined to model empathy
toward other agents during the decision-making process.
Formula (6):

General calculation to calculate the leaf node other desirability has shown in
the Formula (7). In Formula (7),
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is desirability of fact

in the planning

agent reward system that has been discussed in [3.5.3.1] and
affinity level of the planning agent towards the target of fact

is
.

Formula (7):
∑
Agent affinity is a real number bounded, inclusively, by -1 and +1. Therefore, an
undesirable fact for an enemy with affinity level of -1 is actually desirable for the
planning agent, even when the fact is not relevant to any of its goals and affects
the evaluation of that branch. Intuitively, this mechanism is similar to how
humans function in real life; they usually “put themselves in the other person’s
shoe” as well as considering their affinity towards that person.
The final step in visiting a leaf node is to compute the weighted sum of Self Desirability
and Other Desirability, according to Formula (3). Notice that care of consequence is a
context free trait that mediates consideration of selfish and empathic contributions to the
utility measure.

3.7.2.2

Non-Decision Node

As discussed earlier in Section 3.7.1 a non-decision node is an intermediate node with
multiple direct descendants. When such nodes are visited by the planning agent, they are
annotated with probabilities associated with each of their descending branches. A nondecision node may be generated for two possible reasons: (1) there are multiple potential
post-conditions associated with a single action taken by the planning agent (node type B
in Figure 3.17, and (2) planning depends on the decision of another agent (node type C in
the same figure). In the first case, the non-decision node separates multiple postconditions that bring the agent to the non-decision node, from the same antecedent
decision node. Probability of each post condition has been provided by the designer based
on the scenario. In the second case, non-decision nodes separate individual choices of
action associated with a single post-condition, each branching from the same decision
node, from multiple actions that other agents may commit in response to each choice of
action. In both cases, the branches that descend from non-decision nodes represent
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uncertainty; which branch descending from a non-decision node is actualized in the game
world will be determined at runtime, either by the world’s probabilistic determination of
action outcomes, or by other agents’ decision-making processes.
The two cases for non-decision node generation are associated with two different
processes for calculating the probabilities attached to the node. In the first case of
multiple post-conditions for a single action has been given to the agent by designer as
shown in Figure 3.20. In the second case of waiting for another agent to make a decision,
TOM module uses the decider profile as it has been discussed in Section 1.5.1.4 to assign
probability to other agents’ available actions, as shown in Figure 3.21.

Figure 3.20: A Non-decision node because of possible post conditions
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Figure 3.21: A Non-decision node because of multiple available actions for another actor.
Since branches from non-decision nodes represent an exhaustive set of alternatives with
probability , the probabilities associated with each non-decision node must sum to one,
as described in Formula (8). In the runtime only one of these possibilities will be applied
to the world state by the Event Handler.
Formula (8):
0<Pi<1, ∑
All non-decision nodes have more than one edge with a probability between zero and one
associated with each edge. The utility measure associated with each non-decision
simply the weighted sum of the utility of its direct descendants , weighted by each
branch’s estimated probability ( ). This calculation is summarized in Formula (9).
Formula (9):
∑
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is

In the case of calculating probabilities with the help of TOM, the agent performs a series
of steps to ensure the constraints detailed in Formula (8). If the agent does not know the
decider from before, he will use the stranger profile that has in his TOM by default.
1) Trait weight: the planning agent compares each action with the profile of the decider,
that is, the agent who is supposed to make a decision to select a branch descending from
the non-decision node. Each action has been tagged with several traits and their
associated value as it has been mention in Section 3.2.2, for example attacking action can
be tagged to be violent by degree of 1. For each action tag ( ) the agent calculates the
distance of the given tag value in the action (
decider profile

(

) from the associated trait in the

) based on Formula (10). In Formula (10) agent A that is

evaluating the planning tree uses agent B profile in its TOM (

).

Formula (10):
(

)

2) Action weight: The agent repeats the same procedure for all action tags, then it adds
up all trait weights (

) from Formula (10) to find the action weight (

by applying them to Formula (11) .Higher desirability for action
only on TOM profile that A has for B (

)

indicates that, based

), the decider(B) is more likely to choose

action . Of course, this is an approximation the decider profile in the planner TOM is
not necessarily accurate that may cause the agent to make a wrong prediction. This
inaccuracy can have several reasons: a) the TOM profile only contains some traits b) the
agent model is not necessarily accurate. If the agent using pre authored profile the
designer may un purpose provide it with set of inaccurate profile to simulate his own
desirable situation. Furthermore in lack of pre-authored profile the agent needs many
interactions to complete the profile in the runtime c) traits are only one factor involved in
decision making event with a complete profile consistent with the decider model, other
factors such as the decider roles and goals should be considered to make the best
prediction.
Formula (11):
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∑

3) Probability of each action: The last step is to assign a probability to actions
according to their weights. Higher weight means higher probability, the agent calculate
that is aggregate weight of all actions (
decision node. Probability of edge (

) from Formula (11) for the non) will be calculated by Formula (12).

Formula (12):

3.7.2.3

Decision Node

As discussed earlier in [3.7.1]a decision node is a node with descending branches that
model potential actions the can be taken by the planner. The first step is to find how
much the agent personality matches with each action. For each action the agent should
evaluate all traits, the process is similar to finding the level of desirability of an action for
another actor based on its profile with couple of modifications.
For each trait the agent first uses its role associated with the planning tree goal if that role
does not have this trait the agent check its other active roles in order of their importance,
finally the last option is to check the default one. The agent uses Formula (13) to
determine the level of desirability for each action based on its tags. In Formula (13) in
addition to the distance between the tag and trait value, importance of the role (
trait weight (

) affects the Action weight. This mechanism guarantees that

dominant personality trait and higher priority roles have a higher impact in decision
making. In decision nodes lower weight indicates more harmony between the agent
personality and the action.
Formula (13):
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) and

∑
In this stage the agent has a weight assigned to all available actions; bottom up approach
enables it to know the utility of each action descendent node as well. The agent choice
depends on how it balances between higher utility and acting according to its roles and
personality traits. In our system the default algorithm is to find the base ratio which is
utility of the most desirable action (the one with the lightest weight) descendent node
divided by its weight. If in set of action- utility available in the decision node, there is one
with the higher ratio the agent choose that one.
There can be a context free trait as it has been discussed in [3.5.2.3] called Utility
Consideration that affects the agent decision. It determines how much the agent is willing
to deviate from its personality trait to gain a higher utility. The agent with high level of
Utility Consideration always chooses the highest utility. Low level of this trait prevent
agent from any deviation from its roles’ personality traits that means the agent always
chooses the lightest action. We will discuss Utility Consideration as an example trait that
can be used in a decision node further in Chapter 4.
The action selected in each decision node will be saved as a sequence in a plan and will
be kept in Memory module planning component. The plan will be kept in the Memory
section; if the plan becomes invalid the agent will start re-planning which is feeding the
planning module with initial state and active goal.

3.8

Summary

In this section we explained data flow and agent architecture thoroughly. The agent data
flow ensure that all of the agent interaction in the world including, emotion appraisal,
state utility, planning, and emotion reaction will affected by the agent role. Personality
traits have been embedding in the agent role so that they can make an affective
connection with other agent components such as emotion, action selection and planning.
TOM module adds a novel flexibility to our agent to be able to make a plan based on
probable actions of others. Furthermore planning facilitates role based utility and action
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evaluation; interestingly it has the strength to deal with elements of non-deterministic
environment like other actors.
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4

Proof of Concept

The main goal of our architecture is to create believable agents according to the criteria
that have been discussed in Chapter 2. In Section 2.1 we discussed a classic scenario that
demonstrates how a purely mathematic approach fails to predict human behavior. In
Section 2.2 we also discussed a couple of widely-used classic methods in AI games, and
the problems with applying them in a dynamic environment. Our proposed design
solution for a believable agent has been thoroughly explained in Chapter 3. This
architecture can greatly enhance the creation of believable agents by facilitating goal
driven, as well as reactive, behavior based on the agent’s social context. The agent’s
behavioral patterns can be defined through goal importance and action tendency
depending on the social context that has been introduced to our model by the role-based
architecture. Role-based architecture unifies agent motivation and priority, as well as
reactive and deliberative behaviors. The agent planning tree uses TOM profiles to predict
the other actors. The TOM module enhances the agent believability by taking into
account other actors just as humans do. Furthermore, by considering other actors’
decisions by means of TOM, the agent is more likely to develop a better plan. It also
makes the agent more situated by considering the other actor preferences, meaning that
the same agent, in dealing with different actors, does not necessarily picks the same
action. In our design, the data flow that has been discussed in Section 3.1 ensures the
agent is using all of its active roles during its interaction with the world.
In this chapter, as a proof of the concept a prototype has been implemented with
JavaEclipse on the Microsoft Windows 7 platform. To demonstrate and assess the ability
of our prototype system of delivering believable behavior according to our design goals,
we applied our prototype to a classic case study problem, that of the prisoner's dilemma
[51]. In doing so, we were able to show situated decision making based on agent social
context, including who the agent is interacting with and what the effect of the agent’s
decision on other actors involved is. One of the main goals of the system is to simulate
believable agents; however, an evaluation of believability requires extensive user testing
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, believability is subject to
individual and cultural biases. Due to this technical difficulty, we decide to put the main
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focus of this prototype on satisfying believability based on the criteria that have been
discussed in Section 2.1.1 and leave the user testing for future work.
Our proposed agent demonstrates the ability to: a) show the role based architecture
potential to make the agent’s decision a situated one; b) exhibit the application of the
planning algorithm discussed in Section 3.7.2 and its integration with the agent’s social
context; c) take into account the decisions of other agents by means of TOM that have
been discussed in Section 3.4.1.4. To provide a simple and objective evaluation, the
system has been tested in a well-known scenario: the “prisoner’s dilemma”. In this
chapter we will discuss the achievement of these three objectives in our simulation
through the addition of variations to the prisoner dilemma.
In Section 4.1 we briefly discuss those parts of the prototype that have been used in the
evaluation. Section 4.2 briefly discusses the prisoner’s dilemma and its application in real
life situations. Section 4.3 gives a brief introduction to the planning process proposed in
our model for the prisoner’s dilemma tree. Section 4.4 thoroughly describes each
scenario. Lastly Section 0 describes a summary of findings.

4.1

Implementation Specification

Our current prototype role structure, TOM and planning module, Memory, role, planning,
perception and Event Handler and data flow between them has been implemented
according to description in Section 3.1. Figure 4.1 shows the implemented part of design
with highlighted blue color. In the following paragraphs we briefly discuss each of these
implemented modules and their specifications in our evaluation.
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Figure 4.1: Implemented part of the design
The Authoring module, as it has been discussed in Section 3.2.5 enables the designer to
create, change, and customize a role template, as well as TOM profiles, based on the
description provided in Section 3.4.1.4. The Authoring Tool, as discussed in Section
3.2.5 can be used to: a) test the effectiveness of a trait; b) complicate the prisoner’s
dilemma by adding new roles and new situations; or c) evaluate the effect of our TOM
module on the agent’s decision making. One of the innovations in our agent algorithm is
final state (leaf utility) evaluation based on the agent’s role, as discussed in Section
3.7.2.1. Each agent has its own reward system and interest-based goals that will be used
for leaf utility calculation. How much the agent values each fact or element of a potential
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outcome of its action has been defined in its role reward system. For example, the cost of
spending a year in prison or outside of it can be different for each individual; an exconvict, for example, may not be as afraid of spending 5 year in prison as someone tasked
with the responsibility of supporting their family. If two prisoners are members of the
same band of thieves, one who rats out the other one may go free but will pay for his
betrayal once his band finds out about it. Similarly, if the prisoners are enemies, one may
choose to punish his opponents with little regard for the consequences to his decision.
These are all factors that the designer can modify with the Authoring Tool.
The flexibility and usability of each component are other main non-functional
specifications of the design. The implemented system satisfies these specifications
through a role template component that accepts human-authored templates which can
then be assigned to several agents. In our template role structure, TOM and the planning
module have been implemented completely. We have also implemented the OCC
emotion model to check its integration into our own agent emotion module. The Memory
module includes Event History, TOM, and Active Memory, accompanied by data flow
between the Memory and emotion components have been implemented based on the
proposed description in Chapter 3 and Figure 3.1. However, in the evaluation, we did not
use data flow between emotion and Memory; we leave the implementation of this part for
future works. The test scenario focuses on the functionality of role, TOM, and planning.
In Section 3.4.1.4 we proposed two methods to initialize TOM profiles. The first option is
to write specific profiles based on the designer’s story. The second choice is to let the
agent complete its profiles in the runtime by interacting with others and interpreting the
other agents’ personality traits according to the actions of other agents which they
observe. In our current template, to test the functionality of TOM to predict other agents’
actions and affect the agent’s decision making, we decided to pre-author agents’ profile
with the Authoring Tool. This decision took place because, in the proposed problem, we
are curious to check the functionality of our model in specific scenarios; furthermore,
completing the other agent’s profile in the runtime requires many previous experiences.
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In our current template scheme, between the two alternatives of generating a planning
tree, or using the planning repository that has been discussed in Section 3.7.1, ]), we
choose the second one. Getting a planning tree from the plan repository is well-suited for
small environments with limited factors involved, so that the designer can easily provide
all possible steps and agents’ roles do not impact the planning tree generation. We took
into account the fact that the second phase of planning which outputs the final plan is
independent from how the planning tree has been generated. Figure 4.2 is a prisoner’s
dilemma planning tree annotated with relevant factors stored in the system. Inside the leaf
nodes, there are facts that represent the results of potential decisions, where the right side
indicates Alex’s out come and left side is Mark’s. For example, if Alex and Mark both
betray each other, they both receive 5 years of prison. In the run time, the Event Handler,
as discussed in Section 3.2.3, collects agents’ decisions and distributes the results
accordingly. The Agent decision is either to betray or cooperate and the result is a final
number of years in prison for each agent.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, non-decision nodes in the same level have the same set of
available actions. However, our design as it has been discussed in Section 3.7.2 supports
asymmetric trees as well. Each non-decision node’s set of probabilities can be calculated
independently of other nodes; the only important factor from a TOM processing stand
point is the set of available actions (for a given non-decision node) and their given tags,
as has been discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.2: Decision tree for prisoner’s dilemma
The general agent structure and data flow follows the description in Chapter 3. The role
and TOM of each agent can be written and modified via the Authoring System. The
planning tree evaluation starts from the bottom by leaf utility calculation, as described in
the planning section of Chapter 3. This evaluation uses the agent’s active roles weights,
reward system, and possibly context free traits that have been implemented based on the
specifications in Chapter 3. The second step after calculating leaf utility is to process
non-decision nodes.
The Agent uses TOM to predict other agents’ actions; this prediction can have a
significant impact on the planner’s final decision. TOM uses the opponent profile to
assign probabilities to each available action in a non-decision node that need to be
resolved by other actors’ decisions in the runtime. With a functional description of the
system in place, we will first describe the prisoner’s dilemma and then discuss how our
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model traverses the planning tree. Finally, we represent our model’s potential to create
new situations and socially-aware agents that can make decisions
Finally we represent our model potential to create new situation and socially aware
agents to make decision.

4.2

Prisoner’s Dilemma

The prisoner dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. It is a
two player, perfect knowledge, and a non-zero sum game that both players can win or
lose to varying degrees. It uses a hypothetical situation of two suspects, who are
accomplices in a crime, being arrested by the police. The police have insufficient
evidence to convict either, or both, of two suspects of committing a major crime that
carries, with the conviction, a 10-year prison sentence. The police separate the prisoners
and visit each of them individually to offer the same deal. If one testifies against the other
and the said other remains silent, the betrayer (i.e., testifier) goes free and the silent
accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both remain silent, each is sentenced to
only 1-year in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, they both receive a 5-year
sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the other or to remain silent; each subject
has no way of discovering the other subject’s decision before the end of investigation.
The question is, given these parameters, how should each prisoner act?
prisoner A

prisoner B

Stay silent

Betray

Stay silent

Each serves 1 year

A: Goes Free, B: 10 years

Betray

A: 10 years,B: Goes Free

Each Serves 5 years

Table 1: The Prisoner’s dilemma pay off table
A naive interpretation might reason that:


If I stay silent I could go to jail for 10 years



If I tell on my partner, I could go free
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However, this assertion does not cover all possible outcomes; specifically, it leaves out
the fact that one truly does not know what the other subject will do, and it does not take
into account that the other subject’s choice has a significant impact on the results.
Let us evaluate the situation from Alex’s (one of the prisoner’s) point of view. Alex is a
mathematician familiar with decision theory fundamentals. He assumes that the potential
action of the other prisoner (let’s call him Mark) is unknown and unpredictable;
consequently, from Alex’s perspective, Mark is equally likely to stay silent or to betray.
By following the above logic, Alex’s choices imply the following potential outcomes:
 If Alex stays silent:


50% chance that he serve 1 year (if Mark stays silent as well)



50% chance that he serve 10 years (if Mark rats him out)

 If Alex betrays Mark:


50 % chance that he go free (if Mark stays silent)



50 % chance that he serve 5 years (if Mark betrays him as well)

His purely mathematical solution by applying percentages to the outcomes will be as
followed:
Stay silent:
(50% × 1 year)+ (50%×10 years) =5.5 years
Betray the other subject:
(50% × 0 year)+ (50%×5 years) =2.5 years
When he treats both of Mark’s choices as equally possible, betrayal seems the best
strategy. If Alex betrays his partner, the two possible outcomes are zero and 5 years, an
average of 2 ½ years. Furthermore, betraying Mark allows Alex to take the possibility of
10 years of incarceration out of play; instead, he is looking at a maximum of 5years. If
Alex accepts all premises as valid, including that there is an equal chance of Mark
betraying him or staying silent, betraying Mark has the best maximum, minimum, and
average. From a game theory standpoint, betrayal is a strictly dominant strategy.
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However, if Alex looks further, he finds a problem with replacing the inability to predict
Mark’s decision with a 50/50 chance. In doing so, he treats his accomplice as if Mark will
simply flip a coin to make his choice. Assigning an equal chance to Mark’s possible
decisions does not take in to account the fact that: a) Mark is evaluating the situation just
like Alex; b) what Alex might know about Mark; and c) other psychological and
sociological elements involved in Mark’s decision. The betrayal strategy is in Alex’s best
interests insofar as it guarantees the lowest sentence and saves him from the worst case of
10 years in prison. What if Mark follows the same logic and betrays him? In this case,
they are both going to be sentenced to five years. If Alex accepts the fact that Mark is a
reasonable and wise human being, he may have to reanalyze his equation since the
favorable average of 2 ½ years may just be a mathematical deception.
If Alex and Mark can read each other’s minds, the dilemma is resolved. More
realistically, we can consider the possibility that Mark and Alex can use their knowledge
of each other to predict the other’s decision. If Alex believes that Mark can see the
hidden solution of both staying silent, he may stay silent as well. What if Alex knows that
Mark is in fact guilty and he is not willing to tell a lie, or what if they have a previous
history of conflict where Mark has betrayed him and now Alex is looking for revenge?
Furthermore, even if Alex can read Mark’s mind, he may still have some other
motivation to choose an action that doesn’t necessary lead to what decision theory
defines as the most desirable outcome.
By definition, a dominant strategy in game theory occurs when one strategy is better than
another strategy for one player, regardless of their opponents’ strategies and
characteristics [53]. In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, betrayal is a dominant strategy
because it always minimizes punishment under the assumption that all opponent actions
are equally probable; as a matter of fact, two self-interested prisoners who give equal
chances to their opponent’s decisions would betray each other. To move toward a more
believable model of the situation, let us reconsider Alex’s method (from game theory) of
applying equal probability to each of Mark’s decisions without considering Mark’s
characteristics or thought processes.
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Fundamentally, the prisoner’s dilemma is about each subject’s expectations about their
opponents, and how their expected choices affect each other. Table [2] shows the
Canonical PD payoff matrix for situations like the Prisoner’s dilemma. Suppose that the
two players are represented by the colors, red and blue, and that each player can choose
to either "Cooperate" or "Defect". In this table T, R, S, P is each player’s payoff based on
the player and his opponent’s decision. If both players cooperate they, both receive the
reward, R, for cooperation; if blue defects while red cooperates, then blue receives T
while red receives S and vice versa. If both players defect they both receive P. The
condition (T>R>P>S) must be held in prisoner’s dilemma where T, R, P, and S are 0, 1,
5, and 10 years in prison, respectively. The payoff relationship, R > P, implies that
mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection. A decision theoretic agent will
always choose to defect because T>R and P>S [51]. The nuanced challenges posed by the
prisoner’s dilemma have sparked interest in its application to economics, politics, and
biology among other fields [51]. We chose the prisoner’s dilemma to assess our model
because of these interesting dynamics, and because it is a well-researched, wellunderstood problem.
Cooperate

Betray

Cooperate

R,R

S,T

Betray

T,S

P,P

Table 2: Canonical PD payoff matrix
If the agent can plan and behave believably according to its attributes, environment, and
prior knowledge in the prisoner’s dilemma, then it stands to reason that it can apply the
same processes in other similar cases. We are using the prisoner’s dilemma as an
example problem to demonstrate (a) the validity of our architecture when applied to
reasonable human characteristics; and (b) the flexibility of our architecture to model a
wide range of personalities and social relationships.
In summary, naively applying classic decision theory in ignorance of both a model of the
accomplice and the personality of the decision-maker is neither logical nor believable.
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First of all, accounting for the accomplice’s decision-making process makes the agent’s
decision-making process better informed and more logical. Second of all, accounting for
factors peculiar to the decision-maker’s personality and context (i.e., personality traits
and active roles with respect to the accomplice) allows for a more believable decisionmaking simulation.

4.3

Preparing for the scenarios

In previous sections, we described the prisoner’s dilemma and our model implementation
specification. In this section, we take a look at how our architecture model prisoner
dilemma. Figure 4.3 shows a schematic view of the agent in prisoner’s dilemma. During
the planning process, each available action is assigned a probability based on a
comparison between the planning agent’s potentially-imperfect TOM profiles of its
accomplice, along with the action tags associated with each potential choice of action.

TOM

TOM

Profile

Profile

Alex

Role

Mark
Default
Role

Default
Role

Role

Figure 4.3: Schematic view of agent interaction.
In the computation process for a decision node, the agent has a set of available actions. It
evaluates each action individually, based on its active roles by given formulas in Chapter
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3 that takes into account action tags, agent roles and associated trait in each role as well
as their importance. The weighing process enables the agent to compare actions in the
context of their active role and how they enforce the agent to behave in a certain way.
Before introducing more varieties into the prisoner’s dilemma in our scenarios, we will
first explain the planning tree algorithm with the traditional prisoner’s dilemma.
There are three main personality traits that we can consider for the traditional version of
the prisoner’s dilemma to start authoring default roles with:


Cooperation: In the traditional version of the prisoner’s dilemma that has been
discussed in Section 4.2, the cooperation attribute, and the fact that it can change
the agent’s tendency to stay silent or betray, has not been taken into account. In the
decision theory solution for the traditional prisoner’s dilemma, the agent chooses to
stay silent (cooperate) or betray (not cooperate) only based on a probable utility
gain. In our discussion in Section 4.2, we described the importance of psychological
factors in agent decision making. The level of cooperation between agents is one of
these psychological factors that decision theory does not consider in solving the
traditional prisoner’s dilemma. In the decision theory solution, the agent is neutral
with regards to staying silent or betraying the other agent. We will discuss the effect
of level of cooperation on the agent’s decision shortly, in the evaluation of scenario
1. For now, from the personality perspective, we can consider that a higher level of
cooperation increases the chances that the agent stays silent, whereas a lower level
of cooperation makes betrayal a desirable option.



Care of consequence: Care of consequence (COC) is a context-free personality trait
that has been discussed in Section 3.5.2.3. As we have mentioned in chapter 3, the
agent applies context-free personality traits during the planning process. COC will
be used in leaf utility assignment by applying Formula (3) to moderate the degree to
which an agent favors utility for itself over utility for others. In the decision theory
solution for the traditional prisoner’s dilemma, COC is zero; therefore, the agent
does not consider and care for the utility of its opponent. COC aids the agent to be
more believable by: a) considering the other agent’s utility; and b) the fact that the
other agent is also looking to maximize their utilities
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Utility Consideration: Utility consideration (UC) is another context-free personality
trait that determines a margin in which the agent is willing to dismiss its principles
in an exchange for better pay-off. A high level of UC suggests utility-driven agents
behave similarly to as in the decision theory approach, i.e. that they will always
choose the highest utility. On the other hand, a low UC prevents the agent from
deviating from the dictates of its other personality traits, even if small deviations
can change their utility significantly. Both a very high and a very low UC make the
agent’s decision-making predictable because it becomes either utility-driven or it
follows rigidly-embedded personality traits. In a more complicated problem, with a
denser planning tree, it can change the agent’s behavior in various interesting ways.
Our planning structure is unique in facilitating this factor to make action selection
less predictable in a non-arbitrary fashion.
It is very important to note that utility consideration is different from care of
consequence. Care of consequence affects consideration of facts in leaf nodes; it
determines the degree to which other agents’ attitudes towards facts are considered
when the leaf node is visited by the planning agent (i.e., proportion of personal- and
other-desirability). Utility consideration affects computed values at decision nodes.
It determines the degree to which behavioural personality traits “override” the
computed utility of descendent nodes; (i.e., proportion of behavioural personality
and computed utility from descendent nodes). In the decision theory approach, the
agent is always looking for the highest possible utility. Looking for the highest
possible utility makes the agent always choose the action which brings them the
highest possible utility without considering action based on their personality traits.

In our model, the agent uses its traits, utility, and probability of other actors’ expected
behavior to analyze each state. In the following paragraphs, we show how each of the
mentioned traits can affect the planning agent’s decision-making process.
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4.3.1

Leaf utility assignment

Self-Desirability for each leaf from Alex’s perspective (one of our agents) can be
calculated based on Formula (14), where

and

are the number of years that Alex

may be sentenced to prison or go free in the sequence of actions in the runtime which
leads him there.

and

are values of each year of staying in prison or being free,

from Alex’s perspective. For example in L1 in Figure 4.4 where Alex and Mark both stay
silent,

is 1 and

is 9.

Formula (14):
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Figure 4.4: Alex planning tree in prisoner’s dilemma
Other desirability’s for each leaf from Alex’s perspective can be calculated based on
Formula (15) ; this describes Alex’s evaluation of Mark’s situation, where

and

are the number of years that Mark may be sentenced to prison or go free, respectively. As
we have described in chapter 3, Alex uses his own reward system to evaluate the
desirability of the situation from Mark’s perspective; in this formula, this quality has been
represented by using

and

.

Formula (15):
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Alex then calculates the desirability of each leaf by applying

and

to Formula

(16). This formula uses Alex’s care of consequence trait. In decision theory,

is

always 0, making the agent to not take into account the other agent’s situation. Humans
take into account the consequences of their actions on other peoples’ situations even
when they do not have any social ties with them. Our model proposes the
personality trait as an easy solution to providing this quality in agent decision-making.
Formula (16):

4.3.2

Non Decision Node

Alex uses Formula (17) with the level of cooperation in his TOM profile of Mark to
calculate the probability of Mark’s being cooperative or staying silent. In the prisoner’s
dilemma,

, or the number of available actions in a non-decision node, is 2. Formula

(17) is based on procedure that has been explained in the non-decision node of the
planning tree in Section 3.7.2.2. In the prisoner’s dilemma, it calculates

, or the

probability of Mark staying silent according to his profile in Alex’s TOM (

), as

discussed in Section 3.7.2.2. The Formula (17) checks through all available traits that
could be matched between available actions (being silent or betraying) and Mark’s profile
traits ( ). It does the same for

, or the probability of being betrayed by Mark.

Because the prisoner’s dilemma has a symmetric tree,

and

in node 2

and 3 in Figure 4.4 will be the same; however, our planning approach can be applied to
asymmetric trees as well.
Formula (17):

(

∑
∑

( (
∑

( (
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)

)
)

)

)

Alex then calculates the utility of non-decision nodes by applying the probability of each
branch to its associated leaf utility

Formula (18):

Formula (18):

∑(
∑

4.3.3

∑

( (
∑

( (

)

)
)

)

)

Decision Node

In the decision node, Alex uses his personality traits to find the weight for staying
silent

) or betrayal (

) by applying his personality traits to Formula (13) . In the

absence of the utility consideration trait, Alex chooses an action with the lowest weight
that will take him to the highest utility Formula (19).
roles and

is action weight-based on Alex’s

is the utility of its decedent node.

After calculating the desirability of all actions available to them, the agent finds the
ground ratio by dividing the utility associated to the most desirable action by its weight,
as discussed in Section 3.7.2.3. In general, the agent follows its personality; deviation
from the standard is only worthwhile if it causes a significant shift in the agent’s utility.
The ground ratio is the deviation of the utility that the agent can gain by following the
closest action to its personality. All other actions have a higher weight but, if one of these
less desirable actions based on the agent’s personality could bring it a significantly higher
utility, the agent will follow that one. The agent uses the ground ratio to find out if the
option of gaining a significantly higher utility by performing a less desirable action is
available or not.
Formula (19):
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Scenarios

4.4

In this section, we apply our model to test the agent’s decision making in a different
variation of the prisoner’s dilemma. The Authoring System enables us to create
interesting new scenarios by only assigning multiple roles to Alex and Mark (our agents).
Scenario 0 demonstrates simulation of decision theory with our agent default role.
Scenario 1 deals with the main plot of the prisoner’s dilemma; Alex and Mark, who have
not met each other before, use their stranger profile TOM and default roles for making
their individual decisions. Scenario 2 demonstrates our model’s ability to make agent
planning be situated in the social context by introducing a friend role. Scenario 3
demonstrates the quality of asymmetric social roles when Alex treats Mark as an enemy
but Mark considers him as a friend. Finally, scenario 4 simulates an interesting love
triangle that ends with a scarification of one edge to protect his ex-girlfriend and betrayal
of his opponent. In the process of evolving from the traditional scenario to more
complicated ones, the Authoring System changes agent internal data, such as active roles
and TOM profile. By changing how the agent perceives the world and what its priorities
are, the system can simulate more complicated cases. Note that the flexibility in our
design facilitates assigning new and multiple roles to the agent without making any
change in the agent planning process

4.4.1

Scenario 0

In Scenario 0, we present our model's success in modeling the decision theory approach
with our proposed planning tree. The assignments for variables in the planning tree are as
follows:


Cooperation: The agent is neutral towards being cooperative or not. That means that
staying silent

) or betraying the other agent (

) have equal weight. This makes

the agent choose one option based only on which non-decision node has a higher
utility.


UC: The decision theory approach only considers probable utility in decision
making without taking into account the agent’s personality. The agent UC is zero.
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COC: In the decision theory approach, the agent never considers the other agent’s
utility in leaf nodes, making the agent COC trait equal to zero.



: The decision theory approach does not suggest any practical solutions to
predicting the other agent’s decision.

Considering these variables, the agent who follows the decision theory approach makes a
decision based on comparing the results of the below equations from each of nondecision nodes:
(

)
(

(

Due to the fact that

)

(

)

)

)
(

(

)

is positive and

is negative, even with

equal to 1, the

agent betrays its opponent. This decision is due to the variable assignment in decision
theory and the inflexibility that these values impose on the agent decision. The
description above shows our planning process’ success in simulating agents that can act
within the decision theory approach’s predictions. In the following section, we describe
our model’s flexibility in allowing for the creation of new situations through assigning
new roles to the agent. A new role can create a new personality or social context for the
agent. The planning tree uses the agent’s role’s preferences and unique attributes to
choose the best action.

4.4.2

Scenario 1

The plot in the first scenario is same as in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma: Alex and
Mark, who have not met each other before, are arrested, and each one has been offered
the same deal. Validity of the TOM module in this scenario will be demonstrated in a
simple situation by walking agents through the planning process and explaining how each
variable affects the decision-making process. Authoring System partial templates for the
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agent default role and the TOM module for the agent have been shown in Figure 4.5. The
only constraint in assigning a value to “years in prison” and “years of freedom” has been
discussed in Section 4.2 for the general case of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. The
pay-off arrangement in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma is such that the mutual
cooperation receives higher payoff in comparison to mutual betrayal. However, in our
model, by adding more roles to the agent, we demonstrate how the classic prisoner
dilemma can evolve into more interesting cases. For example: the agent may choose to
betray only to punish its opponent (Scenario 3 and Mark in Scenario 4) or the agent may
have other interests that makes them choose to stay silent (Scenario 4). In the following
paragraphs, we discuss how each variable in the role or TOM can affect agent decision
making.

Default Role
Trait Name

TOM

Trait value

Stranger Profile

Care of consequence

Trait

Cooperation

Cooperation

Value

Utility consideration
Active Pursue Goals
years in prison
years of freedom
Figure 4.5: Authoring Tool partial templates for the first scenario
As we have mentioned before, in our role-based architecture, each agent has at least one
default role that formalizes the agent general behavior when the action does not involve
any of the other active roles’ target. Due to a lack of any previous social ties in the
traditional version of the prisoner’s dilemma, Alex and Mark both use their default roles
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in the first plot. Because Alex and Mark do not know each other, they use the ‘Stranger’
profile in TOM to predict the other agent’s actions. Consider a case where Alex has an
average level of Cooperation, which means he has no preferences over staying silent or
betraying Mark (
N1,

). This means in applying Formula (19) to choose an action in

is the determining factor. If Alex’s stranger profile does not detect any

preference for Mark to either betray or cooperate (i.e., the profile reflects a neutral degree
of Cooperation, the same as in the decision theory approach), Alex assumes that each of
the two actions has a 50% probability (

). With equal probability for

both of Mark’s actions, Alex’s only determining factor in making the decision is a
comparison between

. Interestingly, with any degree of care of consequence less than

0.5, Alex betrays Mark; otherwise, he stays silent. The reason for this fluctuation in his
decision making can be seen in Formula (16). Care of consequence being equal to 0.5
means that Alex cares for Mark’s situation as much as he cares for himself. Therefore,
among leaf nodes, L1 has a significant advantage.
If we keep Alex’s ‘Stranger’ profile the same, by decreasing Alex’s care of consequence
or decreasing his cooperation level, he betrays Mark. A higher degree of cooperation
from Mark results in

being greater than

; consequently, N1 (in Figure

4.4) receives a higher weight in the utility calculation of NDN1 (same as N3 and NDN2).
By considering cooperation from Mark, Alex is basically choosing between 1-year in
prison or going free. If Alex has a low degree of care of consequence, he will betray. On
the other hand, by considering the negative value of a 10-year prison sentence for Mark,
Alex may stay silent. The description of the process explains that the close value of
and

does not convince Alex to stay silent. With the close value of

and

based on Alex’s TOM, he would stay silent only if he is

cooperative or has a high level of COC.
This simple example illustrates how modifying roles and traits through the Authoring
System offers the potential to define more interesting characters. For example, increasing
or decreasing Alex’s cooperation—his willingness to work in collaboration with Mark—
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will influence Alex’s decision, just as his impression of Mark’s cooperation will also
exert an influence.
With TOM modules in place, we can enhance our agents further by fine-tuning their
personality through their default roles. A high level of cooperation in Alex causes him to
cooperate with Mark even if his TOM profile of Mark has a relatively low cooperation
value. This means, in comparison to the neutral role, now Alex may stay silent despite
expecting a lower level of cooperation in his stranger profile. Intuitively, a lower level of
cooperation in Alex’s personality makes him prone to betray unless a very high level of
cooperation is present in his stranger profile (close to 1).
We only test Utility Consideration in the first scenario. If we assign it to zero, this causes
Alex to not deviate from his personality in any circumstances. A lower level of the
cooperation trait makes him betray, whereas a higher level of cooperation leads him to
stay silent without considering either of the TOM prediction or utility assignment. On the
other hand, the maximum value of utility consideration makes Alex act in the path that
leads to highest utility; he takes into account TOM and still use care of consequence in
the leaf utility assignment. If TOM predicts cooperation and care of consequence as not
being close to 1, Alex will stay silent; otherwise, he will betray as well.
The utility consideration trait has a very high potential to create interesting behavior in
agents. However, in the next few scenarios, we will not consider it anymore because we
already know how it affects agent decision making. All agents in the next few scenarios
use the best ratio approach to choose their action. In a denser tree with various branches,
utility consideration has a high potential to make agents less predictable .The first
scenario clearly demonstrates our success in implementing TOM and using it in agent
decision making. Furthermore, the decision tree traversal algorithm uses all of the factors
to determine the final decision.
Figure 4.6 represents a diagram with two sets of data. In each data set the agent COC is
constant and the agent has been tested with different degree of cooperation and expected
cooperation from its opponent. Blue and red dots in the diagram recorded the threshold
that the agent switches from staying silent (cooperative action) to betray (non108

cooperative). With the same COC all the points above blue /red line means the gent
would stay silent whereas points above the colored line means the agent would betray. By
decreasing COC, moving from the blue line to the red one, we can see that the same
Cooperation level demands a higher expected cooperation from the opponent to makes
Alex stay silent; Note that the purple point on the red line has a higher level of TOM in
comparison to purple point on the blue line. Comparing the cooperation level of two
yellow points one on the blue line the other one on the red one, also suggests that with the
same level of expected cooperation, Alex with lower level of COC ,yellow dot on the red
line, should be more cooperative to stay silent in comparison to the yellow dot on the
blue line.

1.2
1

Silent

Stranger 0.8
Cooperation 0.6
level in Alex
0.4
TOM

Higher COC for Alex
Lower COC for Alex

0.2

Betray

0
0

0.5

1

1.5

Alex Cooperation
Figure 4.6: COC impact in Scenario 1
The diagram in Figure 4.7 represents the agent threshold for the lowest expected TOM
and cooperation level to stay silent by possessing same level of COC. In this diagram the
agent COC has been kept the same and line represents the agent threshold for changing
its decision from staying silent to betray its opponent. Comparison between red and
purple dots illustrates how a more cooperative agent may stay silent even with a low level
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of expected TOM from its opponent; whereas a less cooperative agent (purple point) has
a higher threshold for expected cooperation from its opponent to stay silent.
1.2
1

Stranger
Cooperation
level in Alex
TOM

0.8
0.6

Betray

Silent

0.4
0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

Alex Cooperation

Figure 4.7: TOM versus Action tendency in Scenario1

4.4.3

Scenario 2

In the second scenario, we introduce the friend role to the implementation; each agent has
a friend role towards the other one which enables the testing of more traits. The friend
role can affect decision making whenever an action involves its target. Alex can have two
different values for his cooperation trait: one for the default role, and the other in his
friend role. He can be generally defined as a non-cooperative person, although he may be
willing to cooperate with his own friends. Figure 4.8 represents a partial template for
roles and variables involved in the second scenario. In the new scenario, although the
agent still has a stranger profile, he will not use it due to the fact that a more accurate
model of Mark has been provided.
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Defult Role
Trait Name
Trait value
Selfishness
Cooperation
Honesty
Utility consideration
Active Pursue Goals
years in prison
years of freedom
Role importance
value

Friend Role
Trait Name
Cooperation
Loyalty

Trait value

Interest Basde Goal
Fact and its state
value
Betrayed(Mark,Alex)=True
Betrayed(Mark,Alex)=False
Betrayed(Alex,mark)=False
Betrayed(Alex,Mark)=True
Target
Mark
Importance
value
Affinity
value

TOM
Stranger Profile
Trait
Value
Cooperation
Mark Profile
Trait
Cooperation
Loyaty

Value

Figure 4.8: Authoring Tool partial roles and TOM profiles for Alex in the second
scenario
The friend role changes leaf evaluation as well. When Alex is calculating leaf utility
because of his friendship with Mark, he cares more about his probable state. Our system
provides this consideration by using their friendship affinity level (

) in Formula

(6) from Chapter 3. Friendship enforces a couple of interest-based goals for Mark and
Alex: now, Alex has a negative value for betraying Mark, or being betrayed by him.
Following the same reasoning, he has a positive reward for not betraying or not being
betrayed. Recently added goals and affinity levels change leaf utility order. In the current
scenario, even with a low level of care of consequence, L1 still has a higher utility in
comparison to others because neither Alex nor Mark has been betrayed. On
due to a higher level of cooperation in Alex’s role towards Mark,

branches,

is smaller than

Not surprisingly, Alex also expects more cooperation from Mark, as a friend, meaning
that

is greater than

. Consequently, when considering all factors
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involved in the scenario, there is no wonder that both Alex and Mark stay silent.

1.2
1
0.8

Silent
0.6

Loyalty

Lower weight for cooperation
Higher weight for cooperation

Betray

0.4
0.2
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

Cooperation
Figure 4.9: Trait and role importance changes the agent decision in scenario 2.
In the diagram in Figure 4.9 blue dots represent the case that agent has equal weight for
cooperation and loyalty based on its role. Red dots represent higher weight for
cooperation trait in comparison to cooperation during the test. Any dots above each
colored line mean that the agent would stay silent, whereas points under the line make the
agent to betray its opponent. The friend role determines high level of cooperation and
loyalty whereas enemy role makes their values small. As we can see by adding loyalty
trait, now the agent can even cooperate with low level of cooperation, and vice versa.
We can add even more complexity to the traditional prisoner’s dilemma by introducing a
scenario wherein two agents are friends and one of them has actually committed the
crime, and the other one knows about it. This new factor does not change the NDN1 and
NDN2 utility in Figure 4.4. However,

and

are different when it is taken into

account that Mark is actually guilty of committing the crime and there is an honesty trait
in Alex’s default role. This new modification in the scenario creates a new dilemma for
the agent: if Alex tells the truth that means betraying a friend, which is in contradiction
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with his cooperation level in a friendship despite having been approved by the honesty
trait contained within his default role.
There are couples of factors that help us analyze Alex’s decision: the proportional
importance of the friend role and default role; trait weights for honesty and cooperation;
and, finally, how much he cares about not betraying Mark. For a loyal friend with a high
importance for friendship, it would presumably be hard to betray a friend. The point in
introducing the honesty factor is that there is now the possibility of a friend betraying
their peers, even with their possessing a high level of cooperation. Assigning more weight
to the honesty trait and default role in comparison to those of cooperation and friendship
results in Alex testifying against Mark. This is interesting because this creates a conflict
within Alex’s thought processes. People often find themselves in conflicting situations.
The fact that our proposed model facilitates the creation of conflicts, as well as different
approaches that an individual character can take to deal with these conflicts, makes our
agents more interesting and believable. Different approaches that the agent takes to deal
with conflicting scenarios represent: a) more depth in the agent’s decision making and
underlying psychological reasoning; and b) more depth to their personalities.

1
0.8
0.6

Honesty

Betray
Hiegher weight for friend role

0.4

Lower weight for for friend role

Silent

0.2
0
0

0.5

1

1.5

Cooperation

Figure 4.10: Conflict of interest caused by role overload in Scenario 2
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The diagram in Figure 4.10 demonstrates when Alex needs to choose between adhering
to honesty trait in its default role or cooperation trait in his friend role, when he knows
about his friend’s crime. Blue dots represent higher weight of friend role in comparison
to the default role. The Blue and red line illustrate the agent threshold to stay silent by
keeping default and friend role weight constant against each other and changing the
honesty and cooperation degree one associated with Alex’s default role and the other
with his friend role. Any point above each colored line, means Alex betray Mark, his
friend, in favor of his default role and honesty trait. In this diagram we can see that if
Alex has a higher level of honesty he needs to have a higher level of cooperation to stay
silent.
The second scenario clearly explains the encapsulation of personality traits in a role
framework. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the role context can affect agent behavior,
as in, for example, Alex’s dealing with a friend priority in action evaluation with traits
that have been defined in friendship (Kind of confusing explanation of the example). The
agent is capable of handling multiple roles and, even more interestingly, is capable of
using more than one role to evaluate one and the same action from different perspectives.
Lastly, it was a good example to illustrate how conflicting goals or traits from multiple
roles can create dilemmas in a role-based architecture.

4.4.4

Scenario 3

In the third scenario, Mark keeps his friendship with Alex; however Alex secretly hates
Mark. We switch Alex’s role towards Mark to ‘Enemy’, illustrated by a low level of
cooperation and a negative affinity towards Mark. There is also a new trait that can be
used in this plot, namely Alex’s loyalty towards Mark. The new setting enables us to
introduce this trait where Alex treats Mark as an enemy; however, Alex knows he will
probably stay silent (

). Therefore, by using Formula (18) to calculate

NND1 utility, the utility of L1 has a higher weight in comparison to L2, as well as to L3
in NND2. Alex’s interest-based goals are also different from the last case: now, he does
not care about being betrayed by Mark. This means no negative valence will be imposed
on L2 and L3.
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Negative affinity towards Mark changes the leafs’ utility order. Once again, adjacent
leafs from the betray action have a higher payoff (L3 and L4); with a low degree of
loyalty, Alex will definitely betray Mark. With a higher level of loyalty, it will be a battle
between loyalty and cooperation weight. On Mark’s side, staying silent is still the
candidate action; unfortunately, there is a very narrow chance that Alex will not betray
him. This means Alex goes free while Mark spends 10 years in prison.
This scenario shows the application of asymmetric social relationships in our system. In
our system, roles can be easily created, modified, and applied to the agent. Each role can
be customized for the agent and desirable scenario.
2.5
2
1.5

|Affinity|

Betray

1
0.5

Silent

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

COC

Figure 4.11: COC versus Animosity in Scenario3.
The diagram in Figure 4.11 illustrates relationship between COC, animosity towards the
enemy, and their affect in the agent final decision. By keeping Alex’s cooperation and
expected cooperation from Mark the same, we played around with COC and affinity. In
this Scenario, Alex doesn’t have an Interest goal to betray Mark instead of that he is
using his own belief system to found out about Mark state utility. Due to the fact that
Alex affinity towards Mark is negative, any undesirable state for Mark carries a higher
utility for Alex. On the other hand, Alex knows that with a high probability Mark will
stay silent. With Low COC Alex betrays Mark but as COC increases he only betrays
Alex if he really hates him.

115

4.4.5

Scenario 4

The fourth scenario modifies the third one with the introduction of two more new roles.
In this plot, both Alex and Mark are aware of a mutual hatred between them, as the two
“edges” of a love triangle. Alice, who was previously in a relationship with Alex, is now
with Mark. This history motivates us to create considerate ex-boyfriend and jealous lover
roles.
Scenario 3 can be the simple version of the fourth one, where Alex does not care about
Alice anymore but he wants to take revenge on Mark. We can assume that, although Alex
loved Alice in the past, he does not care about her anymore and he feels animosity
towards her partner (Mark) now. This situation gives us same result as Scenario 3. In this
case, Mark may know about the whole situation and still treat Alex as a friend. This
would cost him 10 year in prison due to Alex’s betrayal (Scenario 3).
In the second case, we can assume that Alex, despite his animosity towards Mark, still
cares about Alice’s feelings. He knows that by betraying Mark, Mark would either be
sentenced to 5 or 10 years of prison; if he stays silent it will be either 0 years or 1 year,
which brings less grief to Alice. This time, Alex considers the fact that more years in
prison for Mark means a longer period of grief and sadness for Alice, whom he still has a
positive affinity towards. This can be represented in our model by an interest-based fact
that represents a negative value for Alice’s grief. These considerations, once again, shift
the leafs’ utility ranking to have a higher utility for L1 and L2 and, consequently, a higher
utility for NDN1 in comparison to NDN2. Although in Alex’s decision node,
the propagated utility from leafs and their presentation in

and

<

,

makes the

decision a battle between how much Alex cares about Alice’s not suffering grief in
contrast to his own default role’s goal, namely to spend as few years in prison as possible.
Surprisingly, Alex may stay silent despite a low level of cooperation.
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Figure 4.12: Conflict of interest in Scenario4
The diagram in Figure 4.12 demonstrates the battle in Alex mind to betray Mark or stay
silent. Matter of betraying the other side of triangle is a battle between the degrees that
Alex cares for his Ex-lover grief and how much he wants to see his enemy (Mark)
misery. The blue line demonstrates the agent threshold for staying silent by weighting
these two variables against each other. Any point above the blue line represents the agent
betrayal. Betrayal determines the agent higher value towards seeing his enemy misery
despite the fact that he is aware of ex-lover grief.
On Mark’s side, his ‘Jealous’ role towards Alex makes him develop a very negative
utility against any state that provides his opponent fewer years in prison than he has to
endure. He has a low level of cooperation; he also gives a high probability to Alex’s
betraying him. His negative animosity is an additional factor to lead him to betray Alex.
This scenario ended up in favor of jealous Mark going free, and Alex spending 10 years
in prison.

4.5

Summary and Discussion

Scenario 0 to 4 examined consider some possible variations to the traditional prisoner’s
dilemma. The Authoring Tool facilitates the addition of more varieties by allowing for
the design of new roles, traits, and facts. Although we only tested the proposed model on
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one scenario with different variations, our planning algorithm and agent architecture are
general enough to perform within any given scenario and with any role specifications.
The TOM module and its emergent application in the planning tree is one of the main
contributions in our design. In scenario one, the assumption that the other person is a
stranger enables the designer to test the agent’s decision-making with different stranger
profiles. If Alex is not biased towards being cooperative, he does not have any tendency
towards being silent or betraying. The matter of staying silent or betraying will be
determined by Alex’s stranger profile and also his care consequence that has been
determined by the care of consequence trait. A low level of care of consequence allows
Alex to makes his decision only based on his own utility without considering the other
peoples’. With a low level of care of consequence, the agent’s decision is asymmetric to
the decision theory approach. However, by tuning the care of consequences to have a
higher level, the agent will follow the other agent’s decision. As long as care of
consequences does not cause the agent to blindly look for his optimal utility, he will
follow his TOM.
From a psychological stand point, care of consequences enables the agent to make a more
believable decision by considering the existence of other agents and these other agents’
preferences. Although our current prototype does not support recursive TOM, the fact
that the agent considers other agents outside his social network enables him to make more
situated decisions. One of the objections to the decision theory’s solution for the
prisoner’s dilemma is its failure to consider that the other prisoner is also seeking the
highest payoff. Our TOM, care of consequence trait, and their application in the planning
tree, enables the agent to perform more believable behaviors by considering other agents.
The first scenario provides a straightforward test bed to check the functionality of TOM.
Our TOM module affects the agent’s decision-making when the agent is not biased
towards cooperation or does not have a very low level of care of consequence. This is
parallel to human behavior: as long as one personality trait is not dominant, all of the
other factors will also play a role in decision making.
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In Scenario 2, our role components and their application in the planning tree ensures that
the agent is acting according the role context by:


Considering role target in state evaluation: Unlike in Scenario 1, the other prisoner
involved in Scenario 2 is a friend who the agent has a role and affinity towards.
This changes the state utility calculation. The consequences of the agent’s action
will be evaluated regarding to what may happened to his friend.



Behavioral Personality Trait: the agent considers specific personality traits from its
friend role toward the other agent. This makes the agent follow a consistent pattern
of behavior that has been defined by the active role’s personality trait.



Interest Goal: Defining interested-based goals to avoid betraying a friend is another
mechanism that makes the agent considers their social context.

In the second part of Scenario 2, we add another variation, where the agent has to make a
decision between adhering to his cooperation level or his level of honesty in the default
role. This variation represents our agent model’s success to use all active roles in the
agent’s decision-making process. This variation, and the agent’s decision being based on
the relative importance of the cooperation in default role and honesty in friend role, is a
good demonstration of the role’s architecture potential to create a dilemma-based
scenario. Dilemmas could be created for the agent by providing contradicting
components in different roles and assigning them to the same agent.
The third and fourth scenarios demonstrate the flexibility of our model to change the
agent’s decision by changing its role. In scenario 3, Alex has a negative affinity towards
Mark but he knows that Mark will cooperate. Mark’s profile in Alex’s TOM is the same
as in Scenario 2, but Alex’s negative affinity towards Mark, low level of cooperation, and
lack of interest-based goals, causes him to betray Mark.
Scenario 4 represents a battle between action weight and utility. Although Alex is not
cooperative, he stays silent. The agent makes this decision in favor of preventing to cause
his ex-girlfriend sadness. This scenario clearly demonstrates the role-based architecture
to make the agent make unpredictable but, at the same time, allowing the agent to
perform well-reasoned decisions. If Alex purely makes his decision based on his
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cooperation level, this decision would have stayed the same. However, in our planning
algorithm, personality traits are only one factor that causes him to perform a different
action in a different situation with the same set of available actions.
Being in a social context can affect the agent’s decision and behavior. In this sense, our
role model and its integration with the planning tree enables the agent to consider their
social context in all planning steps. Being in a certain social context affects: a) the agent’s
action tendency (For example: Alex, with the same default role, chooses a different
action in Scenario 1 and 2.); and b) The agent’s perspective of the word state; our
architecture facilitates this by introducing interest-based goals (For example: Alex’s leaf
utility assignment in scenario 2 and 3 are significantly different.); and c) The agent’s final
decision, even with same action tendency (For example: in scenario 4, Alex has a low
level of cooperation but the utility calculation makes him cooperate.).
In conclusion, the role architecture and its components, such as goals, traits, and the
reward system, add layers in the agent’s decision-making. This layered behavior situates
our agent in their social context. More importantly, because the agent’s decisions involve
many factors, it is hard to predict. By comparing the results from all of the scenarios, we
can assert that the agent’s decision is not based on one single attribute or quality. The fact
that the agent is cooperative does not make him act cooperatively in all given situations.
Predictability, as discussed in chapter 2, is one of the main problems with current NPCs.
The agent’s planning consists of several atomic elements that each play a role in the
decision making process.
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5

Conclusions

In conclusion, the design presented in this work addresses the problem of believability in
human-like agents that were introduced in Chapter 2. One of the main problems in classic
AI is its rigid structure. Making changes in the behavior of agents created with classical
AI requires modifying scripts, and as the amount of code increases, keeping track of
changes becomes problematic.

5.1

Summary

Four test scenarios in Chapter 4 thoroughly represented our model’s potential to add
more variety to the agent without undergoing a change in the structure of the agent
model. The agent was situated in the social context with role components such as belief,
personality traits and goals. By changing these components the designer can create a new
role and expect a different behavior. Our role-based architecture is expressive; assigning
more than one role to the agent can easily enrich the character with multiple facets based
on how the character relates to others. The planning process is novel in considering the
agent roles’ components in all steps. During the planning process the agent weighs both
the context and its own preferences in pursuit of its goals. The agent utility assignment
has the ability to perceive others’ utility through the agent reward system. Planning not
only considers other agents’ utility but also takes into account the effect of other actors’
decisions. The TOM module enables the agent to take into account the decisions of other
agents. This is another factor that enables the agent to be more socially aware by: a)
considering world facts based on its role, b) considering other actors decision. Due to the
fact that the planning tree focuses on the agent’s active role and evaluates action and
states according to all related roles’ attributes, the agent’s decision is not easily
predictable. The proposed TOM module and its application are general enough that it can
be used in any scenario for any kind of personality. The current implementation can
provide the agent with one facet of contextualized rational decision-making. The agent
can consider multiple facts, roles and traits that can all determine or change the planning
evaluation during the decision making process to some degree.
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5.2

Contributions

Our proposed model in particular has made the following contributions:


The Role based architecture ensures that the agent performs coherent behavior in
one specific role. The agent roles define how it perceives events and world facts,
which affects its decision making.



One of the main factors in the agent decision making is considering other agents in
its planning by means of the TOM module.



Our planning architecture takes into account all of the agent’s roles’ components.
The planning module guarantees that in all steps the agent evaluates states or
actions based on its active roles.



Being able to cope with nondeterministic situations makes the agent more
believable. The role based architecture enables the user to author their desired agent
with customized qualities.

5.3

Future Work

This architecture provides many avenues for future work, including:


TOM: Expanding the TOM module so that it can learn during runtime using
machine learning algorithms. Our TOM module is unique in that it uses the profile
of other agents in order to predict their actions. However TOM module only
performs one level of recursion, so we leave the higher levels of implementation of
theory of mind to future works. Higher levels of theory of mind can construct the
complete planning trees of other agents and therefore come up with a more accurate
prediction.



Integrating Emotion: Integrating emotion with the planning tree is another
interesting area that can be investigated further. The agent’s Emotional State can
affect its decision making; this can be reflected by mapping Emotion Traits to
specific behavior or traits. The agent in who is enraged can use this personality trait
instead of its active roles personality traits. For example, an agent that is angry has a
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higher tendency to act as an aggressive person even though its personality is not
aggressive.


Memory: Memory module can also be optimized for agents that need to perform in
real-time. Our current Memory structure can be optimized by putting limits on the
number of Memory Cells. Introducing heuristics that discard events not only based
on their chronological order but their importance from the agent’s perspective is
another interesting area of research that can be further developed.



Integration in a Real Game: Deploying the agent model as NPC in a real game
through observing its integration in the game environment with complicated
scenarios and more agents involved has been left for future work as well. This
implementation enable user testing that has been mentioned earlier.



Other Module: Implementing the complete emotion, planning tree generation,
learning aspect of TOM and intention recognition has been left for future work as
well.
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